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PREFACE
The Federal grant-in-aid device is historically 
one of the principal mechanisms the nation has utilized 
in accomplishing its goals and objectives. Since the 
Eisenhower administration, in particular, there has been 
an acute awareness of the chaotic nature of the adminis­
tration of the country's grant-in-aid system. Many 
theoreticians and practitioners recognized that if the 
nation's goals, both social and material, were to be met, 
extensive modification of the present Federal grant-in- 
aid picture seemed essential.
Because ours is an urban society, the public 
officials responsible for urban areas must be in the fore­
front of the formulation and implementation of public 
policy. Consequently, city officials must be made aware 
of, and actively assisted with, Federal grants and pro­
grams that have a direct influence on their given munici­
palities .
The Federal Regional Council system is one attempt 
to come to grips with the unwieldy nature of Federal 
grant administration as it relates to the nation's urban 
areas. In order to simplify the administration of
Federal grants and speed the delivery of Federal services. 
President Nixon directed, through an executive order in 
1972, that Federal agencies be decentralized to the 
regional level. Ten Councils were established in each 
of the ten Federal regions to assist all general purpose 
governments within their respective regions. The Federal 
Regional Councils are designed, in the main, to coordinate 
different Federal grant making "human resources agencies" 
at the regional level in order to aid local and state 
public officials when they are seeking information about 
or assistance, with Federal programs or grants. It was 
also hoped that the establishment of the Councils would 
aid various Federal departments and agencies in coordi­
nating their programs with other agencies, as well as 
aiding Federal departments decentralize their programs to 
the regional level. One of the principal theories behind 
the Federal Regional Council concept is that Council mem­
bers, due to their proximity, can develop and maintain a 
greater sensitivity to the needs of state and local govern­
ments within their region than can Washington bureaucrats.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the 
impact that three selected Federal Regional Councils have 
had on Federal grant assistance to local government offi­
cials in these respective Federal regions. The study 
describes and analyzes the attitudes of city officials
xvi
and Council members toward the Council performance in 
their respective region.
Since the principal method of the investigation 
is by survey, it was necessary that a time demarcation 
point of July, 197^> be set for this research. Legisla­
tion enacted, or programs implemented after this date are 
not described by the author because the attitudinal survey 
was conducted prior to this date. If we continue to move 
toward Federal bloc grants and revenue sharing a substan­
tial modification in the present grant administration 
arrangement will inevitably occur. This study, however, 
focuses on the original purpose of the Council system, 
i.e., to rationalize the categorical grant arrangement.
There are, quite obviously, a number of approaches 
one could utilize in researching the Federal Regional 
Council system. One could employ a decisional approach, 
i.e., what Council agencies, groups, and individuals were 
active in meeting certain municipal needs when they were 
presented; or, one could utilize a descriptive historical 
approach to the formulation of the Council system. After 
extensive deliberation the author concluded, however, 
that the most feasible approach to understanding the rela­
tionships and interactions that exist between the Council 
and their recipient cities was by surveying a sample of
Council members as well as city officials within their
xvii
Federal region. Consequently this study emphasizes the 
performance aspect of Federal Regional Councils, i.e., 
are Councils playing the role they were intended to play 
when they were established?
One official has stated that the Federal Regional 
Councils did not emerge full grown like Athena from the 
brain of Zeus. It is because of the great truth of this 
remark that the author introduces the study with a brief 
historical resume' of Federal grant administration.
X V X I X
CHAPTER I
IfHY THE NEED FOR FEDERAL REGIONAL COUNCILS
Part I. A Brief Historical Resume of Federal Grants in 
Aid
Before going into the specifics of the Federal 
Regional Council arrangement, a brief resume of Federal 
grants-in-aid is covered in order to provide a more com­
prehensive perspective of the role and intent of the 
Federal Regional Council system within the American 
Federal system.
Federal grant programs have provided a coopera­
tive method for achieving national goals that the nation 
would have found difficult, if not impossible, to attain 
otherwise. The accessibility of the grant-in-aid 
mechanism has given public legislators at various levels 
of the Federal system a proven format for policy formula­
tion and implementation. It has provided,for the alloca­
tion of responsibilities between the different levels of 
government according to prescribed criteria of administra­
tive and fiscal efficiency.^
Daniel J . Grodzins, The American System: A New
View of Government in the United States (Chicago; Rand 
McNally and Company, 19bb), p. 6̂ %
These criteria can be simply stated: the national
government assumed partial responsibility for sup­
plying funds and primary responsibility for estab­
lishing minimum standards of service, because the 
national government possessed superior fiscal resources 
and was concerned with the general welfare of the 
residents of all states. The states (and their politi­
cal subdivisions) assumed primary responsibility for 
administration because they were in the better posi­
tion to interpret and meet local needs.
The interaction between the national government 
and the states, in addition to the device of matching 
funds, has prevented any absolute demarcation between 
grant financing and the establishing of standards on the 
one hand and program administration on the other hand. 
Instead the entire grant process of policy determina­
tion, financing, and administration can be characterized
3as a circular, cooperative process.
Grants-in-aid, which have been utilized by the 
Federal government in some form from its origin are 
essentially a mechanism by which a larger governmental unit 
gives financial aid to a smaller governmental entity and 
assures that certain functions will be performed and 
certain minimum standards maintained throughout the 
granting jurisdiction. "True grants-in-aid are
^Ibid.
^Ibid.
4W. Brooke Graves, American Intergovernmental 
Relations: Their Origins, Historical Development and
Current Status (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964),
p. 506.
3
intergovernmental from one public treasury to another, 
and usually from the treasury of a higher level, more 
central government, into the treasuries of the local 
governments included within the central government's 
area,"^ Although the present system of Federal grants- 
in-aid is largely a twentieth century phenomenon, prece­
dents for the grant mechanism extend back to the founding 
of the American Republic.^
It has been said that one of the basic principles 
of federalism is that the superior resources of 
the central government shall be used to initiate 
and support national programs, largely administered 
by the political subdivisions. If this is true, 
it is clear that American federalism early passed 
the test. Even before the present government was 
established, land grants had been made for many 
worthy purposes.'
The principle of providing assistance to smaller govern­
ment entities by the federal government was established 
early in American history. The early grants were, in 
the main, land grants. Land grants for education date 
back to the eighteenth century, and quite extensive land 
grants for internal improvements, education, and agri­
culture were given during the nineteenth century. In
William Anderson, The Nation and the States, 
Rivals or Partners? (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1955) > P* 1?6.
6 .Graves, op. cit.
^Ibid., 48l.
the twentieth century, grants have been administered prin-
gcipally for highways, health, welfare, and education.
Thus the grant-in-aid system has evolved from land 
grants to cash grants and from "single shot" to 
annual payments. Federal control has increased, 
and financial participation by the states and muni­
cipalities has been encouraged through the develop­
ment of matching f o r m u l a e . 9
Some of the salient distinguishing character­
istics of the contemporary federal categorical grant- 
in-aid system can be traced back to 1862 when Congress 
enacted the Morrill Act, which assisted states in main­
taining land-grant colleges. The Morrill Act lucidly 
specified the objectives of the grant, placed limiting 
conditions on the utilization of revenue derived from 
che granted lands, and required annual reports.*'Ttie 
pattern of categorical grants was thereby established: 
needed resources were provided in exchange for the accept­
ance of certain minimum standards for a specific pur­
pose.
During the latter part of the nineteenth cen­
tury, Federal aid in the form of annual money grants was
^Ibid., 478.
^Ibid.
^^U.S. Congress, A Commission Report of the 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations: 
Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System, Vol. I 




extended in three program areas. The first of these 
were agricultural experiment stations in 188?, followed 
by aid to veterans homes in I888 and Land Grant Colleges 
in 1890.12
The Woodrow Wilson Administration had a profound 
influence on intergovernmental relations and the nation's 
grant-in-aid system. The Wilson administration marked 
both the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment as well 
as the first use of the grant-in-aid mechanism in which 
the national government proposed a comprehensive program 
and offered large grants to states willing to partici-
13pate. Federal grants-in-aid were given a substantial
impetus with the passing of the Sixteenth Amendment; in
1913. The subsequent inevitable financial disparity
between the federal and lesser governmental entities
was somewhat alleviated by grants-in-aid awarded by the
federal level to the lesser levels in the federal system.
The income tax soon proved to be a readily expandable 
source of revenue which, as World War .1 demonstrated, 
could funnel billions into the national treasury.
The war’s end brought a reduction in national expendi­
tures, although not to the 1913 level. The Congress 
and the executive were thus in possession of a finan­
cial tool of the first magnitude.
1 ?Ibid., 139.
13Richard H. Leach, American Federalism (New York; 
W. W. Norton and Company, 1970), pT I96.
^^Grodzins, bp. cit., pp. 42-43.
6
The Smith-Lever Act of 1914, which established
the cooperative agriculture extension program, is reputed
to be the administrative prototype for most subsequent
federal grant-in-aid programs. The Smith-Lever Act is
characterized by three principal features which have
become virtually standard requirements in federal grant-
in-aid programs: (l) an apportionment formula for fund
distribution among the s t a t e s , (2) 5O-5O state matching
requirements,^^ and (3 ) advance federal approval of state 
17plans.
By 1916, the federal program of cooperative agri­
culture extension work was utilizing #1.1 million of Smith- 
Lever money matched by an additional #597,924 from the
1 g
states. Added to these fvmds was #1.1 million from
the Department of Agriculture, #873,000 from state and
college funds, #973,000 from county funds, and #277,000
from philanthropic and other funds.
These large expenditures, the importance of the 
program, and the many groups involved in it focused
Deil S. Wright, Federal Grants-in-Aid: Per­
spectives and Alternatives (Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute^ I9O8) , p. 5»
^^U.S. Congress, Senate, Impact of Federal Urban 
Development Programs on Local Government and Planning 
(Committee Print), 88th Cong., 2nd sess., 1904, pT 3^
^^Wright, op. cit.
18Grodzins, op. cit., p. 43. 
l^ibid.
national attention on the system of conditional 
grants. Once accepted as a useful combination of 
national money with local needs, in a program of 
national, social, and economic interest, the grant 
device was now ready for further evolution. Public 
opinion and official thinking seized upon it as a 
basis for new social and economic programs. Conse­
quently, in the years immediately following the 
Smith-Lever Act, a number of influential programs 
developed, including the Federal Aid Road Act of 
1916, the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917, the Chamberlain- 
Kahn Act of I918, and the Sheppard-Tower Act of 1921.20
Economic and social changes in the earlier part 
of the twentieth century had a profound impact on inter­
governmental relations and in particular the role of 
grants-in-aid. After 1929 the number of individuals 
who depended on day-to-day earnings for a livelihood 
and who lost this means of support in the nation's
economic collapse, reached proportions too staggering
21for the state and local governments to handle. The 
federal government deemed it essential to massively sub­
sidize state and local governments in order for them to 
remain viable institutions during this era. One student 
of federal grants-in-aid has observed that the narrow 
and crooked paths of federal-city relationships of past
years evolved in the 1930's to express ways connecting
22the city halls and the national Capitol.
2°Ibid.
^^Ibid.
22Wright, op. cit. , p. 111.
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Direct relations between Washington and the cities, 
long existent but as long submerged, were brought 
to the surface and recognized openly for what they 
were. The chief instrument by which this transfor­
mation was effected was the grant-in-aid.^^
Considering the complete expenditures of state 
and local governments federal grants had little sig­
nificance until the depression years of 193^-1939»
During this brief period grants for VfPA, PWA, FERA 
and other programs significantly increased the totals 
to an average of over $2,000 million a year and supplied
funds for over 25 per cent of state and local expendi- 
2^tures. In the 1930’s, of course, the Federal Govern­
ment launched a plethora of new welfare and economic 
security programs. These programs were designed to 
assist not only individuals but also to alleviate the 
pressures on depleted state and local resources. Measures
were inaugurated, for example, to provide low-rent public
215housing and improve health service.
Many of these grants, especially those authorized 
by the Social Security Act of 19351 provided for
^^Ibid.
24William Anderson, Intergovernmental Relations 
in the United States as Observed in the State of Minne­
sota: Intergovernmental Relations in Review (Minneapolis:
The University of Minnesota Press, 196O), pT 45.
2 5U.S. Congress, Senate, Impact of Federal Urban 
Development Programs on Local Government and Planning, 
op. cit., p. 139.
extensive administrative supervision by the National 
Government, including the requirement, added in 
19395 that State and local personnel participating 
in Federally aided programs in health, welfare and 
employment security be selected and administered 
under a merit system of personnel administration.
A retrenchment in federal grants started in 
3.939» Many of the federal programs operative during 
the depression were dropped starting in that year.
During the American involvement in World War II, more­
over, all federal grants were curtailed. By 1946 state
and local funds obtained from federal sources were drasti- 
27cal.ly reduced.
Then began another spectacular rise in federal aids, 
due partly to the enactment of some important new 
regular aid programs, so that by 1952, . . . the
total of regular grants came to #2,593 million, 
which accounted.for ovex- 10 per cent of all stateand local expenditures.28
The extensions of federal responsibility during 
the twentieth century were, in the main, sponsored by the 
Democratic party, and were fought, at times quite bitterly,
29by the Republican party.
The Republican party and its leadership attacked 
the expansion of federal power, and much of the
2^Ibid.
27Anderson, Intergovernmental Relations in the 
United States as Observed in the State of Minnesota; 
Intergovernmental Relations in Review, op. cit., p. 45 »
^^Ibid.
^^James L. Sundquist and David W. Davis, Making 
Federalism Work (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institu-
tion, 1969), p. 7.
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political debate from Woodrow Wilson to Lyndon 
Johnson centered on that issue. In Republic 
rhetoric, the aggrandizement of the federal govern­
ment was part of the Democrats' effort 'to achieve 
their goal of national-socialism'--in the words of 
the 1952 Republican platform--and its result, in 
the mixed metaphor of that same document was 
'weakened local self-government which is the corner­
stone of the freedom of men.'^
President Eisenhower ran for election on that 
platform, of course, and entered the office of the 
presidency with a genuine commitment to halt the exten­
sion of federal programs and reverse the trend toward 
centralization. In a speech at a Governors Conference 
in Seattle, Washington, on August 4, 1953, President 
Eisenhower stated that: ". . . I am here for a very
simple purpose, because of my indestructible conviction 
that unless we preserve, in this country, the place of 
the State government, its traditional place--with the 
power, the authority, the responsibility, then we are
not going to have an America as we have known it ; we
31will have some other form of government." President 
Eisenhower's mechanism for ceasing the expansion of 
federal programs and consequently increased federal 
authority was his Commission on Intergovernmental
3°Ibid.
31U.S. President, Public Papers of the President 
of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the
Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 
1953-71 Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, p. 536.
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Relations, which later became known as the Kestnbaum 
32Commission. In a speech at the White House Conference
of Governors on May 5> 1953 he outlined the purpose of
the Kestnbaum Commission. "We are deadly serious about
this business of trying to find a logical division
between the proper functions and responsibilities of
33the State and Federal government."
In a speech on March 30, 1953, in which President
Eisenhower recommended the establishment of the Kestnbaum
Commission, he emphasized the theme of decentralizing
authority from the federal level by attacking the federal
grants-in-aid system directly.
. . . there is a need to review and assess , with
prudence and foresight, the proper roles of the 
Federal, state and local governments. In many 
cases, especially within the past twenty years, the 
Federal Government has entered fields which, under 
our constitution, are the primary responsibilities 
of state and local governments. This has tended to 
blur the responsibilities of local government. It 
has led to duplication and waste. . .
President Eisenhower emphasized in this speech that, "A
major mark of this development has been the multiplication
3 2Sundquist and Davis, op. cit., p. 8 .
3 3U.S. President, Public Papers of the President 
of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, op. cit. ,
p. 260.
Ibid. , p. 39.
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of the Federal grants-in-aid for specific types of 
activities.
The Kestnbaum Commission forthwith rejected the
concept of federal encroachment at the state level and
upheld the cooperative view of federalism by maintaining
that the state and federal levels should not be viewed
as competitors but should be viewed as cooperating with
and complementing each other in an era of increased
demands on both governmental levels. No plan was offered
by the Commission to the point of dividing federal and
state governmental functions and responsibilities.^^
President Eisenhower, however, was not to be
deterred by the lack of responsiveness by the Kestnbaum
Commission for his dual federalism concept. At a
governors' conference at Williamsburg, Virginia, on
June 24, 1957> he stated:
I have not the slightest doubt that, by mobilizing 
our collective leadership, we can revitalize the 
principle of sharing of responsibility, of separa­
tion of authority, of diffusion of power, in our 
free government. . . .  I have a competent man and 
his assistants trying to identify those things we 
believe the Federal government has improperly 
invaded the rights and responsibilities of 
States. . . .3'
^^Ibid.
^^Sundquist and Davis, op. cit., p. 8 .
^^U.S. President, Public Papers of the President 
of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the
Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 
1953-) , Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, pp« 494-496.
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President Eisenhower then created a federal- 
state committee for the purpose of sorting out govern­
mental functions. The committee, however, did not 
present suggestions that could be considered meaningful 
revitalizing principles for the federal system. ". . . I t  
proposed that the federal government eliminate grants- 
in-aid for vocational education and for sewage treatment 
plants, and that a portion of the tax on local telephone
o O
service be made available to those states." Even these 
quite modest proposals were quickly disposed of by 
powerful interest groups which would have been directly 
involved by the implementation of such changes.
President Kennedy, in contrast with President 
Eisenhower, was more concerned about the nation's needed 
functions being performed than in what level of govern­
ment performed them. President Kennedy's approach to 
the federal grants-in-aid mechanism was in stark contrast 
to President Eisenhower's perspective. In proposing the 
creation of a Department of Urban Affairs and Housing 
in a message to Congress January 30, I962, he stated:
I propose to act now to strengthen and improve the 
machinery through which, in large part, the Federal 
Government must act to carry out its proper role of 
encouragement and assistance to States and local
o
Sundquist and Davis, op. cit., p. 9.
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governments . . .  we will neglect our cities at our 
peril, for in neglecting them we neglect the 
Nation.39
Before the 1960*s the typical federal assistance
program did not involve an explicitly stated national
purpose. Federal grants were, in the main, a method of
merely aiding state and local governments to accomplish
their modest objectives. Policy making rested with the
state and local governments. The limited federal review
that existed extended primarily to the "caretaker" areas
of economy and efficiency, and did not touch on substan-
40tive aspects of policy making.
The federal agencies saw their role as one of tech­
nical assistance rather than control. They would 
offer advice, and work with the states to improve 
their programs, but they would not substitute their 
policy judgment for that of the recipient agen­
cies. ̂
The 1960's, however, marked a significant new 
phase of American federalism. Congress, through signifi- 
cant enactments, asserted for the first time national 
interests and authority in a myriad of governmental 
functions that previously had been the exclusive domain 
of state and local governments. In the 1960's model
39U.S. President, Public Papers of the President 
of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the
Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 
1961-) , John F . Kennedy, I962, pp. 77-78»
40Sundquist and Davis, op. cit., p. 3»
41Ibid.
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the grant was viewed as a method of enabling the federal
government to accomplish its objectives rather than a
means whereby the local governments accomplish their
goal. ". . . The motive force is federal, with the
states and coiiiimmities assisting--rather than the other 
42way around.” Manifesting the transformation of the 
federal process in the 1960's was the substantial 
increase in the number of grant-in-aid programs available 
to commmiities. Most of the increase in grant programs 
and authorizations between the years of 1964-1968 took 
place in the Department of Health Education and Welfare. 
However other federal departments expanded their bureau­
cracies also in order to increase their grant-in-aid 
services to state and local governments. The adminis­
tration of federal grants-in-aid became a vast operation,
spanning approximately twenty-five departments and agen-
43cies and over 135 bureaus. Two of the principal con­
sequences of increased grants-in-aid, and especially of 
the shift toward specific project grants, were increased 
problems of coordination and greater discretion in the
44hands of federal administrative officials.
42 . ,Ibid. , p . 4.
4 3Wright, op. cit., p. 8 . 
^^Ibid.
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By the mid 1960's the problems of federal grant 
proliferation and lack of coordination among administering
45agencies had indeed reached a crisis point. Increased 
criticisms of the grant-in-aid situation was concomitant 
with the peak years of grant-in-aid authorizations asso­
ciated with President Johnson's vigorous War on Poverty 
programs.
From the point of view of the grant recipients-- 
State and local governments--the sheer number, 
variety, and complexity of grants make it all but 
impossible for eligible recipients to be fully aware 
of what aids are available, which Federal agencies 
administer them and how they suit particular needs.
A major complaint of State and local governments 
concerns this informextion gap.^°
The complexity of the grant-in-aid system
bewildered state and local officials. Many localities
were forced to add a grant officer to their staff to
47interpret the maze of grants.
Each statute had its own administrative strategy.
Some programs followed the older model of federalism; 
most were patterned on the new. Formula grants 
coexisted with project grants. Established agencies 
vied with new ones as the recipients of federal funds 
in a welter of relationships and patterns that varied 
from agency to agency and from program to program.
45Sundquist and Davis, op. cit., p. 13.
46U.S. Congress, A Commission Report of the 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations: 
Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System, op. cit., 
p. 131.
^?Ibid.
Sundquist and Davis, op. cit., p. 15.
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Over 1,000 categorical grant programs are listed 
in the current Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance.
As each of these categorical programs came into being, 
it was accompanied by its own individual set of esoteric 
federal guidelines, administrative requirements, and unique
practices. "The leadership of elected state and local
public officials frequently was undercut, and it is
clear that the funding uncertainties and red tape burdens
have weakened state and local capacity to govern, blunted
the effectiveness of programs, and greatly increased the
49cost and time of response to public needs."
As the complexities of the grants-in-aid situa­
tion increased, pressure in Washington to alleviate the 
burdened grant recipients grew. Congressman Richard D. 
McCarthy of New York remarked in the House of Representa­
tives;
Today we must cope with eighty-six new programs for 
local assistance--all passed by the 89th Congress, 
and eighty-four previous programs. These I70 
Federal-aid programs are currently financed by more 
than 400 separate appropriations and are administered 
by twenty-one Federal departments and agencies 
assisted by IfjO Washington bureaucracies and more 
than 400 regional offices--all of which can gather 
applications and dispense Federal funds. . . . Sub­
sequently, many of these programs move slowly if at 
all, and prompt inefficiency at all levels of govern­
ment. Towns, cities, and smaller villages--who 
often come to consider the Federal Government a
49Dwight A. Ink, "Federal Assistance Review 
(F.A.R.) Program,” Public Management, LIV (November,
1972), 19.
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great ogre with interest only in large urban areas-- 
have no real clearing place where they can know 
immediately what aid is there for them, how they 
can become eligible for the aid, and how they may 
apply for it.^
As criticism of the maze of federal programs 
intensified in the mid-1960's, the government responded 
by creating an elaborate structure of coordination in 
Washington as well as the community level. At the 
Washington level the government designated several 
coordinating mechanisms with responsibility in a par­
ticular field, but completely powerless to enforce 
coordination on an interagency basis. For example, the 
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development was made 
responsible for coordinating urban development programs 
while the Secretary of Agriculture was given the respon­
sibility for coordinating rural p r o g r a m s . B y  I965 
federal agency coordination mechanisms were being desig­
nated with such frequency that one of the coordination 
officials referred to the situation as the "coordinator
c 2of the month club." Problems with this multiplicity 
of coordinators, of course, arose immediately. One of
U.S., Congress, House, Representative McCarthy 
speaking for aid to Cities and States. 90th Cong., 
l^t sess., February 8 , 19&7, Congressional Record, 3129 
/a reference to the bound volume, which is differently 
paged from the Daily Digest7.
^^Sundquist and Davis, op. cit., p. 20.
^^Ibid., p. 26.
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the principal problems was the overlapping of authority, 
that is, a particular problem would, by its very nature, 
overlap several designated coordinators. The problems 
that arose from these modest coordinating bodies were 
so overwhelming that "by 19^7 the cry for coordination 
that was rising from governors, mayors, and other partici­
pants in the federal system at all levels was directed 
less toward the need for coordinated federal programs 
as such than to the need for bringing order to the maze 
of coordinating structures that federal agencies were
53independently propagating."
Two of the more publicized coordination mechanisms
that the Johnson Administration employed in order to
reorganize the delivery system of federal programs were
the Community Action Agency and the Model Cities Program.
The Community Action Agency under the Office of Economic
Opportunity was implemented in 1964 for the purpose of
54coordinating the War on Poverty Programs.^
In January of 1964 President Johnson stated 
clearly the explicit role that the Community Action 
Agency was to play in the federal system.
Poverty stems from no one source, but reflects 
a multitude of causes. Correspondingly, a number 
of individual programs have been developed over the 
years to attack these individual problems of job 
opportunities, education, and training. Other spe­
cific programs deal with . . . health, housing,
5^Ibid. 
54David M. Austin, "Resident Participation: 
Political Mobilization or Organizational Co-optation?" 
Public Administration Review, XXXII (September, 1972), 
p. 410.
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welfare, and agricultural services. I propose to 
establish a means of bringing together these separate 
programs--Federal, State, and local--in an effort 
to achieve a unified and intensified approach to this 
complex problem, in which each separate element rein­
forces the others.
Under this proposal, locally initiated, compre­
hensive community action programs would be developed, 
to focus the various available resources on the 
roots of poverty in urban and rural areas. I shall 
shortly transmit to the Congress legislation ini­
tiating this attack. . . .55
The Community Action concept was frequently char­
acterized as a mechanism that would draw federal, state, 
and local programs together and meld them into a coor­
dinated attack on the problems of poverty. However, as 
soon as the first agencies were formed under the auspices 
of the Office of Economic Opportunity, they began to evolve 
in directions not anticipated by those who designed the
56concept. From a coordinating perspective the Community 
Action Agency concept was a rather dismal failure.
Their lack of effectiveness is usually attributed to the 
following reasons: the heated controversy over partici­
pation of the poor in the agencies; the deemphasis on 
planning as a prerequisite for assistance; the lack of 
government support for aid to the poor; and, the contro­
versy resulting when the agency demanded limitation of 
community assistance to "high priority" projects. As a
55U.S. President, Public Papers of the President 
of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the
Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 
19^3-)^ Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, p. 132.
56Sundquist and Davis, op. cit., p. 32.
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result of these phenomena the power structure of local
communities eschewed the Community Action Agencies, and
as outcasts they were rendered powerless to perform as
57an efficacious coordinating mechanism.
The Model Cities Program soon replaced the ineffec­
tual Community Action Agency as the principal coordinating 
vehicle of the War on Poverty. Model Cities, in some 
respects, used different terminology to describe many of 
the same functions and activities previously undertaken
cQ
by the Community Action Agencies. The cardinal point, 
behind the Model Cities Program originated in a task force 
appointed by President Johnson in 1965- One of the pri­
mary concerns of this task force was the rising criticisms 
against the problems associated with urban renewal pro­
grams. The central focus of the task force was to recon­
cile the physical rebuilding of the cities with bettering 
the social milieu of the citizens as well.
While urban renewal might remake the physical struc­
ture of a city slum, the critics observed, it did 
little to improve the lives of the slum's inhabi­
tants. Indeed it worked the other way--it added to 
the problems of the poor by forcing them out of 
their neighborhoods into other slums to make way 
for the 'federal bulldozer.' Residents of black
5?Ibid.
58Howard W. Hallman, "Federally Financed Citizen 
Participation," Public Administration Review, XXXII 
(September, 1972J1 p"! 423 •
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ghettos commonly referred to urban renewal as ’Negro 
removal.’5"
The task force emphasized "the concentration of resources 
from all quarters on problems of urban blight and decay, 
the coordination of governmental and private assistance 
in deploying those resources, and the mobilization of 
local leadership and initiative to assure that the citi­
zens affected by the action planned to take part in the 
decisions leading up to it."^^ The basic relationship 
inherent in the Model Cities Program involves the Depart­
ment of Housing and Urban Development and city demonstra­
tion agencies.
To be effective, concerted attacks on city 
problems must be planned by the cities themselves.
The new Model Cities Program is now the primary 
incentive provided by the Federal Government to 
accomplish this objective. Special grants will be 
made to help transform entire blighted areas into 
attractive and useful neighborhoods. To receive 
these grants, cities must: Develop imaginative and
comprehensive plans of action; and enlist Federal, 
State, local and private resources in a concerted 
effort to bring their plans to fruition.
Localities participating in the Model Cities Pro­
gram were expected to develop comprehensive city demon­
stration programs which would be implemented through
^^Sundquist and Davis, op. cit., p. 80.
^^Leach, op. cit., p. 234. >. . . c .
^^U.S. President, Public Papers of the President 
of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the
Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 
19&4-), Lyndon B. Johnson, 196?, p. 53»
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the concentrated and coordinated utilization of Federal, 
state, local public as well as private funds. Federal 
funds for Model Cities were of two types: categorical
funds and special Model Cities supplemental funds, that 
is, funds that could be used flexibly for a comprehensive
62range of uses. The primary emphasis of Model Cities 
was that cities must plan the attack on their own unique 
problems. Special grants would be available to assist 
the transformation of entire blighted urban areas into 
inhabitable neighborhoods. In order to receive federal 
grants to assist cities in their programs, city officials 
were required both to submit a comprehensive plan and to 
work with all levels of the federal system to implement 
their plan.^^ One of the principal differences in Model 
Cities and Community Action Agencies was that the admin­
istrative mechanism was to be an accepted public agency in 
the case of the former agency, and, of course, it was 
hoped that Model Cities would operate as a communitywide
U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Develop­
ment , The Federal Grant Process; An Analysis of the 
Use of Supplemental and Categorical Funds in the Model 
Cities Program, Community Development Evaluation Series 
Pubn. No. 10 (1972), p. 4.
^^U.S., Bureau of the Budget, The Budget of the 
United States Government, Fiscal Year T 968 (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 19^7), pp. 25-26.
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planning and coordination mechanism vis-a-vis an agency 
of advocacy and confrontation. The Model City’s Com­
munity Demonstration Agency, due to its bicameral organiza­
tion of community representation and official public 
representation was infinitely more effective as a coor-
64dination mechanism than was the Community Action Agency. 
The Community Demonstration Agency director was, in many 
cases, at the epicenter of intergovernmental activity 
that related to both the physical and social aspects of 
the municipality. One of the weaknesses of the Model 
Cities Program, however, was that it left out the state 
governmental level. Applications flowed directly from 
the federal departments to the c i t i e s . I n  the final 
weeks of 1^68 President Johnson's Administration a sub­
stantial amount of federal funds were provided to this 
program in the hope that it could be propelled past 
possible budget cuts of the Nixon presidency
In the early stages of the Nixon Administration, 
a number of alterations were made in the Model Cities 
Program. Local governments were asked to establish
^^Sundquist and Davis, op. cit., p. 99*
G^ibid., p. 14.
^^Joseph L. Zentner, "Presidential Transitions 
and the Perpetration of Programs: The Johnson Experi­
ence," Western Political Quarterly, XXV (March, 1972),
p. 7-
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lucid priorities among alternative proposals for action 
in an effort to determine the more urgent problems, 
rather than dissipating resources in attempting to attack 
all problems simultaneously. More extensive efforts were 
made to involve state government officials in the Model 
Cities Program and the regional offices for Model Cities 
were shifted to the same cities as the offices for the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Office 
of Economic Opportunity, and the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare. The Nixon Administration pledged 
continued support of Model Cities but at a reduced level 
of financial assistance.
Part II. The Establishment of Federal Regional Councils 
Because of local government officials' bewilder­
ment with the mass of federal programs operating in 
their jurisdiction, in September, I968, the then Bureau 
of the Budget launched an experiment to aid state and 
local government officials by having Federal agencies 
attack problems increasingly in the field. Regional 
officers from Housing and Urban Development, Department 
of Labor, Office of Economic Opportunity, and Health, 
Education and Welfare in four regional cities were asked 
to meet regularly and to familiarize themselves with
^^Leach, op. cit., p. 254.
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each other's programs and problems. It was hoped this 
effort would achieve more coordination in the implemen­
tation of the programs of these departments. These 
informal meetings were, in effect, the first experimental 
Federal Regional Councils.
Although the regional council concept was ini­
tially tested in the waning days of President Johnson's 
Administration, it received major attention in the Nixon 
Administration because of its potential of bringing order 
and efficiency to the delivery of federal resources and 
because of its compatibility with his New Federalism 
program's emphasis on bringing governmental decision
69making closer to the people.
The Nixon Administration was convinced that 
President Johnson's approach to the coordination of 
grants-in-aid was inadequate. A far more comprehensive 
revamping of federal grant administration would be required 
than such stop-gap programs as Community Action Programs 
and Model Cities, In fiscal year 1973. $43,000,000,000
Frederick V. Malek, Deputy Director, Office of 
Management and Budget, Speech before the Subcommittee on 
Intergovernmental Relations of the House Committee on 
Government Operations on Federal Regional Councils and 
Other New Federalism Initiatives," Executive Office of 
the President, Office of Management and Budget, Press 
Release, January 29» 1974, p. 4.
69Melvin B. Mogulof, "Federal Interagency Action 
and Inaction; The Federal Regional Council Experience," 
Public Administration Review, XXXII (May, June, I972) ,
232.
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flowed to state and local governments through 1,200 
separate federal programs. There are sixty-one federal 
departments, commissions, independent agencies, and coun­
cils engaged in grant administration. Approximately 550 
of the 1,200 separate programs are main-line grants-in- 
aid. The red tape generated by the current organization 
is indeed unwieldy for local officials. Each of the 
550 programs is operated by specialists. Responsibility 
for their administration has run from the top specialists 
in Washington right down to the specialists at the local 
or state level. Each group of functional specialists has 
its unique esoteric procedures and its oivn methods of com­
munication. The primary disadvantage of this situation
is that one will find few specialists who have an interest
70in other than their own narrow programs.
They are concerned first and foremost with their 
immediate program responsibilities, and secondly 
with some coordination of related programs within 
an agency. Outside of the agencies responsibilities 
there is little or no interest in c o o r d i n a t i o n . 71
The primary problem with this specialist-oriented
arrangement is that it has completely bypassed general
purpose officials at the state and local government
William H. Kolberg, "The New Federalism: 
Regional Councils and Program Coordination Efforts," 




72levels. Chief elected officials had not been effec­
tively brought into significant aspects of planning and
73decisionmaking in the categorical grant system. These 
officials are under two handicaps in a system dominated 
by functional specialists: "They are responsible to the
citizens for the results of the grant-in-aid programs 
and must stand for election on the basis of these results;" 
and "When you bypass the general purpose local govern­
ments, or the generalists, you do not develop the kind 
of coordinative relationship required to make the system
74a realistic whole."
A strong leadership position filled by state and 
local officials has been a primary theoretical tenet of 
American democracy. In practice, however, too frequently 
the politician has been viewed with suspicion and conse­
quently has been circumvented whenever possible. Local 
school districts, special districts, and Community Action 
Projects are only a few examples of devices that have 
been utilized to restrain the jurisdiction of general- 
purpose officials. The sponsors of New Federalism realized 
that the general executive must be brought back into the 
federalism process since general purpose executives are
^^Ibid.
73Malek, op. cit. , p. 3.
74Kolberg, op. cit., p. $1.
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the only ones in the political system to be directly
accountable to the electorate and, in addition, they
have the abilities to coordinate resources in order that
75the general good may be served.
Because of these foregoing phenomena the Federal
Regional Council arrangement was established. "Somehow
within this multitude of categorical programs, each with
its own worthy end, the federal government must coordinate
better and relate the objectives of these programs to the
general ends of* governors, mayors, and executives of the
other units of general purpose local government. This
emphasis on aiding state and local officials in federal
program coordination is, of course, compatible with the
New Federalism Program which was identified closely with
the Nixon Administration. The New Federalism concept
calls for Federal support in meeting national problems,
and holds that State and local authorities are best able
to make decisions on local and state needs in accordance
77with the unique local environment and aspirations.
President Nixon formally manifested his interest 
in the regional council concept in an executive order 
of March 27> 1969» This executive order established
f^ibid., p. 52.
T^Ibid.
77Malek, op. cit. , p. 4,
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uniform regional boundaries for four of the Federal
agencies most concerned with the development of human
resources (Department of Health, Education and Welfare;
the Department of Labor; the Department of Housing and
Urban Development; and the Office of Economic Opportunity)
and in addition ordered the creation of regional councils
in ten designated federal regional headquarter loca- 
78tions. The four human resource agencies were joined
by the Department of Transportation in being designated
79as the core membership of the Regional Council. In 
the executive order of March 27, 19^9, President Nixon 
asked the Director of the then Bureau of the Budget to 
join with the heads of nine departments and agencies in 
a review of existing relationships between centralized 
authority and their field operations. This review was 
designed to produce recommendations as to how each par­
ticipant agency could eliminate unnecessary steps in the 
decentralizing process, could develop organizational 
forms and administrative practices which would mesh more 
closely with those of all other departments, and could 
give more day-to-day authority to those who are at lower
U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents 
of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the
Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 
(1 9 6 9 ), Richard M. Nixon, 19^9, PP* 255-257*
79Mogulof, op. cit.
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levels in the administrative hierarchy. The Bureau of 
the Budget then launched the three year Federal Assis­
tance Review effort (FAR) to bring some order to the 
categorical grant system, to push decentralization and 
to implement the decision to establish ten Federal
80Regional Councils.
On February 11, 1972, the Federal Regional Coun­
cils were formalized by executive order. This executive 
order included the decentralization of two additional 
agencies: the Law Enforcement Agency and Environmental
Protection Agency. This made a total of seven agencies 
that were to operate in councils established in each of 
the Standard Federal Regions. The headquarters and their 
respective federal regions are: Boston, Region I; New
York City, Region II; Philadelphia, Region III; Atlanta, 
Region IV; Chicago, Region V; Kansas City, Region VI; 
Dallas, Region VII; Denver, Region VIII; San Francisco,
81Region IX; and Seattle, Region X.
Regions IX, VI, and II, of which this research 
concerns, are delineated as follows: Region IX consists
of California, Nevada, Arizona, Hawaii and the Trust 
Territories; Region VI is composed of New Mexico,
GOlbid.
^^U.S. President, Executive Order 1164?, "Federal 
Regional Councils," Federal Register, XXXVII, No. 30,
Feb. 12, 1972, 3167-3169.
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Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas; Region II 
embraces New York and New Jersey. See Figure 1-A.
The executive order of February 11, 1972, stated 
that "The proper functioning of Government requires the 
development of closer working relationships between 
major Federal grantmaking agencies and State and local 
government and improved coordination of the categorical 
grant system." The Domestic Council was directed to:
(1) receive and develop information necessary 
for assessing national domestic needs and defining 
national domestic goals, and to develop for the 
President alternative proposals for reaching those 
goals ;
(2) collaborate with the Office of Management 
and Budget and others in the determination of 
national domestic priorities for the allocation of 
available resources;
(3) collaborate with the Office of Management 
and Budget and others to assure a continuing review 
of ongoing programs from the standpoint of their 
relative contributions to national goals as com­
pared with their use of available resources; and
(4) provide policyStic issues."2 advice to the President ondomesi
In this executive order the Office of Management 
and Budget was assigned the responsibility for assisting 
the President in developing efficient coordinating 
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The functions of the Federal Regional Council 
were designated as follows:
(1) the development of short-term regional inter­
agency strategies and mechanisms for program delivery;
(2) the development of integrated program and 
funding plans with Governors and local chief execu­
tives ;
(3) the encouragement of joint and complementary 
grant applications for related programs;
(4) the expeditious resolution of interagency 
conflicts and coordination problems;
(5) the evaluation of programs in which two or 
more member agencies participate;
(6) the development of long-term regional inter­
agency and intergovernmental strategies for resource 
allocations to better respond to the needs of States 
and local communities ;
(7) the supervision of regional interagency pro­
gram coordination mechanisms; and
(8) the development of administrative procedures 
to facilitate day-to-day interagency and intergovern­
mental cooperation.83
In this executive order an Under Secretaries
Group for Regional Operations was created. The Under
Secretaries Group is composed of the Under Secretaries
of all member departments and agencies on the Council.
The Under Secretaries Group for Regional Operations 
shall, consistent with the objectives and priorities 
established by the President and the Domestic Coun­
cil, establish policy with respect to Federal Regional 
Council matters, provide guidance to the Councils, 
respond to their initiatives, and seek to resolve 
policy issues referred to it by the Councils. The 
Under Secretaries Group, under the Chairmanship of 
the Associate Director of the Office of Management
®^Ibid.
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and Budget, shall be responsible for the proper func­
tioning of the system established by this Order.
On March 10, 1972, a month after Executive Order 
11647 was issued, the Under Secretaries Group for Field 
Operations issued guidelines for the Councils which 
detailed the responsibilities of Council chairmen, 
procedures for the conduct of Council affairs, the means 
to be used in the resolution of conflicts, the instruc­
tions for the development of work plans, and the responsi­
bilities of member agencies for providing staff to the 
Councils. The combined effect of the Executive Order 
11647 and the guidelines was to accord Councils a more 
formal and recognized position in the administrative 
apparatus of the Federal Government and to enlarge the 
opportunities for Council to come to grips with problems 
of field coordination in the administration of grant- 
in-aid p r o g r a m s . F o r  an analysis of the organizational 
structure of the Council and its relationship to other 
federal mechanisms, see Figure 1-B.
A further executive order relating to Federal 
Regional Councils was issued July 25» 1974, which modified
G^ibid.
®^Alan L. Dean, Special Advisor to the Under 
Secretary, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 
"Coordinating Regional Operations: The Emerging Federal
Regional Councils," Speech before the Highway Research 
Board 50th Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., January 23» 
1974.
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Table 10. An Organizational Chart of the Federal Regional.Council System
STRUCTURE 
DOMESTIC COUNCIL
UNDER SECRETARIES GROUP FOR 
REGIONAL OPERATIONS
UNDER SECRETARIES WORKING GROUP
FEDERAL REGIONAL COUNCILS
Chairman
Representative from each of the mem­
ber agencies of the Under Secre­
taries group -having access to 
policymaking levels of his agency.
Representative of the Deputy Director, 
Office of Management and Budget
Chairman
Deputy Director,Office of 
Management and Budget
Under Secretaries of the Departments 
of:
Labor
Health, Education, and Welfare 
Housing and Urban Development 
Transportation 
Administrator, Law Enforcement Assis­
tance Administration 
Deputy Director, Office of Economic 
Opportunity 
Deputy Administrator, Environmental 
Protection Agency
Chairmen
Regional heads of the departments of: 
Labor
Health, Education, and Welfare 




Regional heads of the:
Office of Economic Opportunity 
Environmental Protection Agency 
Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration
Designated from among the Regional 
Heads of member agencies
Chairman
Vico President of the United States 
Attorney General
Secretaries of the Departments of: 
Agriculture 
Commerce
Health, Education, and Welfare 





Chairman, Council of Economic 
Advisors
Director and Deputy Director, Office 
of Management and Budget 
Counsellors (2)
President of the United States
.DUTIES AND RESPONSI- 
BILITIES______
Receive and develop in­
formation necessary to 
assess national domestic 
needs and define goals 
and to develop alterna­
tive proposals to reach 
those goals
Generally responsible 
for the Federal Re­
gional Council System 
including establishing 
policy on Council mat­
ters, providing guidance 
to Councils, responding 
to their initiative^, 
and resolving policy 
issues referred by 
Councils.
Provide staff support to 
the Under Secretaries 
■group including serving 
as a focal point for the 
group in their respective 
agencies, monitoring and 
evaluating Federal Regional 
Councils' activities, and 
providing liaison and 
guidance to Councils to 
help in solving issues.
Develop closer working 
relationships between 
major federal grant- 
making agencies and state 
and local governments and 
to better coordinate 
their categorical grant 
services to state and 
local governments.
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Executive Order 1164?• The Departments of Agriculture 
and Interior were added to the Council system bringing 
the total to nine member departments and agencies.
Council functions were maintained with one addition. 
Responsibility was extended to general program coordina­
tion imparting on State and local government, in addition 
to the previous responsibility for coordinating grant- 
making.^^ In effect Federal Regional Councils were now 
expected to be in the forefront of developing and main­
taining a working partnership with State and local 
governments covering a comprehensive range of Federal 
grants and other forms of assistance.
The activities of Federal Regional Councils have 
been delineated by one writer into three primary general 
areas: interagency coordination, intergovernmental rela­
tions, and crisis management. In attempting to facili­
tate increased interagency coordination four principal 
programs deserve mentioning: Integrated Grant Adminis­
tration (IGA); Regional Management Information System
(RMIS); compliance with standard federal requirements;
88and coordinating program delivery.
U.S. President, Executive Order 11731, "Amending 
Executive Order No. 11647 Relating to Federal Regional 
Councils," Federal Register, XXXVIII, No. 142, July 25,
1973, 19903-19904.
Q ̂
Malek, op. cit. , p. 9-
00Ibid. , p. 10.
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Federal Regional Councils have administered twenty- 
six Integrated Grant Administration Projects which allow 
applicants for multiple, yet related, grants to submit 
a single application for Federal assistance. "Review by 
the agencies is synchronized, with a single set of 
requirements for financial control, record-keeping, and 
auditing.
Councils are involved in the development of infor­
mation systems to strengthen overall Federal, State and 
local planning, problem analysis, and program evaluation 
activities. Regional Management Information System, 
though only in its developmental phase, has enabled the 
Councils "to provide more comprehensive budgetary infor­
mation to all States on selected grant programs, assure 
that state and local officials are afforded an oppor­
tunity to review project applications through more 
systematic monitoring of grant applications, and utilize 
a wider range of data from various Federal sources for
Federal, State and local planning and evaluation of
90multi-agency projects."
Councils encourage compliance with standard 
federal requirements in such areas as grant administra­




grant review and coordination procedures. This effort 
responds to past criticisms from State and local offi­
cials that Federal administrative policies have not 
been consistent and are not always implemented uniformly 
in the field.
The Councils are involved in several instances 
of coordinating Federal program response relating to 
specific State and local problems, for example, the 
Federal Regional Council in Kansas City has been coor­
dinating a riverfront development project which involves 
two states, six counties, numerous municipalities and 
six federal agencies. "The Council and local representa­
tives identified and assisted in mobilizing Federal 
funds for planning and a key Federal grant around which
92local governmental and private investment is coalescing."
Encouraging intergovernmental coordination is 
another area in which the Council has devoted their 
efforts. Some of the activities that comprise the inter­
governmental coordination phase of the Council’s opera­
tions are: the Annual Arrangements Program; the Planned
Variations Program; encouraging working relationships 
with state and local governments ; encouraging working 




regional budget briefings; regional energy briefings;
93and intergovernmental conferences. Of this list of
activities the only programs that perhaps would need
some explanation are the Annual Arrangements Program
and the efforts toward encouraging relationships with
State and local governments.
Annual Arrangements is an innovative mechanism
for delivering Federal funds to units of general purpose
local government in a way that emphasizes comprehensive
planning and program coordination under the direction of
94the local chief executive. The principal objectives 
of the Annual Arrangements process are to enable city 
officials to improve the coordination of federally- 
funded and local programs, to increase their ability to 
set local priorities, and to improve the management capa­
cities of the local chief executives and local general
95purpose government.
Another experiment to achieve flexibility and 
coordination at the community level is the Planned Varia­
tions Program which is administered under Housing and 
Urban Development guidance in twenty participating cities.
93lbid., p. 13.
94U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Develop­
ment , Annual Arrangements; Improving Coordination of 
Community Development Programs, Community Development 
Evaluation Series Pubn. No. Ï4 (May, 1973), P* y.
^^Ibid., p. vii.
4l
Local chief executives have the opportunity to review 
requests for Federal assistance from the Housing and 
Urban Development Program prior to finding decisions. 
Planned Variations has provided financial assistance for 
the review and comment process, and eliminated as much
96unnecessary paperwork as the law permits.
Federal Regional Councils have established a 
variety of methods to establish effective working rela­
tionships with State and local governments. Some of 
these methods include "agency representatives working, as 
staff liaison to governors' and mayors' offices; indi­
vidual regional directors working with States where they 
are particularly effective; forming State and local 
advisor groups; meeting regularly with State-employed 
Federal-State coordinators; and having representatives of 
governors, municipal-county associations, and Indian
tribes attend Council meetings and work directly with
97Federal Regional Council task forces."
When the need arises Federal Regional Councils 
have been involved with crisis management. A few examples 
of past involvement in this area are: energy program
assistance; base closings; Rapid City, South Dakota, flood 
rehabilitation; and assistance after Hurricane Agnes 
flooding. Recently Federal Regional Councils mobilized
^^U.S.j Office of Management and Budget, Responsive 
Federalism Report to the President on the Federal Assis­
tance Review (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1973). p. 11.
^^Malek, op. cit.
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temporary personnel and technical assistance for the ten 
regional headquarters of the Federal Energy Office as 
well as the sixteen State-Federal Allocation Officers.
In other examples of crisis management the Federal 
Regional Councils attempt to coordinate the resources 
and programs of Federal, State and local governments in 
responding to a c r i s i s . 98
The three federal regional councils that this 
paper covers are involved in diverse activities and func­
tions that are tailored to meet the needs of their respec­
tive regions. The following is a list in some detail of 
the recent goals or accomplishments of the New York City, 
Dallas and San Francisco Federal Regional Councils.
The New York City Council, Region II, has cate­
gorized its past accomplishments into five principal 
phases; increased program impact through joint action; 
developed local government management capacity; improved
intergovernmental relations; developed crises response;
99and reduced administrative complications.
I. Increased Program Impact Through Joint Action
A. Special effort was made to fund applications
from the Spanish speaking community. A total of 
$2,300,000 in Department of Labor, Environmental
^^Ibid.
^^U.S. Office of the President, Federal Regional 
Council, Region II: New York, New Jersey, Puerto Rico,
Virgin Islands (Washington, D .C .: Government Printing 
Office, 1974), p. 8.
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Protection Agency, Health, Education Welfare, 
Housing Urban Development, Law Enforcement Assis­
tance Administration and Office of Economic 
Opportunity funds were committed.
B. Housing and day care services have been provided 
by Housing Urban Development and Health Education 
Welfare in the Town of Brookhaven to assist 
Brookhaven Internal Revenue Service Center em­
ployees .
0. Under the Integrated Grant Administration pilot 
effort. Housing Urban Development and Environ­
mental Protection Agency funded the Genesee 
Finger Lakes Regional Planning Board's proposal 
for a total of #260,800. Health Education Wel­
fare and Housing Urban Development funded three 
elements of the New York City office of Neighbor­
hood Government's application for an integrated 
services delivery system totaling $365>538. The 
Syracuse Integrated Grants Administration was
wi thdrawn.
D. The Appalachian Regional Commission, Housing 
Urban Development, and Economic Development 
Administration jointly funded the New York State 
Disaster Recovery Planning effort.
E. Health Education Welfare and Department of Labor 
signed an agreement on the Migrant Work Group 
proposal to fund the New Jersey Migrant and 
Seasonal Workers Information Center.
F. Housing Urban Development, Environmental Protec­
tion Agency, Department of Transportation and 
Health Education Welfare conducted a joint Equal 
Employment Opportunity compliance review in 
Westchester County.
G. The Federal Regional Council reorganized the 
Model Cities interagency function adding Environ­
mental Protection Agency, Law Enforcement Assis­
tance Administration and Department of Transpor­
tation as ad hoc members.
H. Department of Transportation funded #333,000 to 
the Syracuse Aging Model as a result of efforts 
of the Committee on Aging.
1. Employment of Spanish speaking staff in the seven 
agencies was increased by fifty.
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II. Developed Local Government Management Capability
A. Procedures for Chief Executive Review and Com­
ment under the Planned Variations experiment 
were adopted and implemented by each agency,
B. Regional Interagency Management Information 
System Committee has provided State and local 
governments with information on the Boston/Dallas 
pilot efforts.
C. Formula grant budget information based on the 
proposed Federal Year 1974 budget was provided 
to each of the Governors to assist them in their 
own budget planning process.
D. The Committee on Youth worked with several locali­
ties to develop integrated youth services delivery 
systems. Results were limited.
Ill. Improved Intergovernmental Relations
A. The Federal Regional Council held briefings on 
the President's Budget for Federal Year 1974 
for State and local government chief executives 
in five locations throughout the Region. Over 
400 individuals attended.
B. Planned Variations conferences were scheduled in 
Newark, Paterson and Rochester. The Federal 
Regional Council met with the Mayors, City,
County, State and local organization officials 
to explain the Planned Variations concept.
IV. Crises Response Was Developed
A. The White House assigned to the Federal Regional 
Council responsibility for coordinating the 
Federal participation in the long-term recon­
struction effort in areas affected by Tropical 
Storm Agnes. For this purpose the Council was 
expanded to include the Office of Emergency Pre­
paredness, the Corps of Engineers, Small Busi­
ness Administration, the Department of Agricul­
ture, the Appalachian Regional Commission and 
the Economic Development Administration. The 
Council worked closely with the New York State 
Office of Planning Services to coordinate dis­
aster recovery plans through the Southern Tier 
Central Regional Planning and Development Board.
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The Federal Regional Council designated a 
coordinator to provide technical assistance to 
local officials in the area.
B. New York State, the Corps of Engineers, the
U.S. Geological Survey and Housing Urban Develop­
ment reached an agreement on flood plain mapping.
C. Federal Regional Council/Office of Economic 
Opportunity memorandum of agreement signed for 
future Phase III reconstruction operations.
D. Housing Urban Development, Department of Trans­
portation and Small Business Administration 
reached an agreement to coordinate programs 
impacting on Phase III disaster operations.
E. The Federal Regional Council is monitoring the 
Great Lakes flood potential to determine whether 
any preventative actions can be taken by the 
Federal Regional Council.
F. The Community Relations Service and the Federal 
Regional Council have agreed to a mutual alert 
system with regard to civil disturbances.
V . Reduced Admiziistrative Complications
A. Interagency agreements were reached on the four 
jointly funded projects which were part of the 
Spanish action plan transferring administrative 
and audit responsibility to one lead agency.
B. The Governor of New Jersey issued an Executive 
Order designating sub-state districts as a result 
of Federal Regional Council concern.
C. The Federal Regional Council agreed to waive 
Federal requirements in Newark and accept the 
City's Travel Regulations as the applicable 
regulation for all federal grant-in-aid programs 
funded to the City.
D. Office of Economic Opportunity Transition Task 
Force established. Department of Labor, Office 
of Economic Opportunity and Health Education Wel­




The Southwest Federal Regional Council, Region VI, 
has developed a group of priority projects. Here are a 
few of them;
Chief Executive Review and Comment--The top 
elected official such as the Governor of a State or 
the Mayor of a City is given the opportunity to review 
and comment on applications for Federal assistance 
within his area of jurisdiction. The Council hopes 
to have the program operative in one city in each 
State in the region, in the State of Arkansas, and 
in the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area this year.
Delegation of Authorities--Administration of 
Federal programs has tended to focus at the Federal 
level activities which could more effectively be 
handled by State or local government. The target for 
this year is to identify and delegate a minimum of 
six such functions to State or local government.
Annual Arrangement--City officials can better 
manage and coordinate programs with an advance knowl­
edge of the Federal resources which will be allocated 
to their city in the future. An annual arrangement 
is an agreement between the Mayor and the Federal 
agencies linking local plans and priorities with 
Federal program funds. Completion of such an arrange­
ment with the City of Tulsa and use of the project 
to identify and resolve interagency differences is 
planned this year.
Integrated Grant Administrâtion--Federal grant 
procedures in the past have been complex. Integrated 
grants aim at development of a means by which several 
Federal agencies can work together to meet local 
needs by synchronizing their resources in developing 
single application, funding, monitoring and auditing 
procedures. Four integrated grants with planning 
agencies and one with the Pueblo of Zuni are sheduled 
this year.
Selected Project Evaluation--Some earlier Council 
programs have progressed to the point where their 
effectiveness can be evaluated. Evaluation of three 
such projects is planned this year.
Crime and Delinquency Reduction--Coordination of 
the multiplicity of Federal criminal justice and law
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enforcement activities through intergovernmental 
and interagency agreements will eliminate confusion 
and costly overlap and duplication of services. 
Agreements with the State of Louisiana and with the 
city of Dallas, Texas, are planned this year.
Regional Profile--To meet its objective of improving 
delivery of Federal services to State and local govern­
ments, the Council requires information about regional 
needs. A profile will be developed to provide much 
of this information.^®^
The Region IX Federal Regional Council, San Fran­
cisco, has set seven objectives for its Council to 
attain. These objectives are;
1. The development of a problem statement and analysis 
of Regional concerns, drawing upon quarterly 
meetings in State capitals and assessments pro­
vided by Council agencies and governmental offi­
cials, in order to provide a more rational basis 
for Fiscal Year 1975 Council work planning.
2. To strengthen Tribal government planning and 
management capacity and coordinated delivery of 
Federal resources to reservation Indians through 
Council review and response to Tribally-developed 
comprehensive plans with at least three of the 
following five Indian communities-~Papago, Fort 
McDowell, Tule River, Pyramid Lake, and Fort 
Apache.
3- The design, joint negotiations, and initial imple­
mentation of an interagency annual arrangement 
with one of the following--the City and County of 
San Francisco, the Navajo Reservation, and the 
City of San Jose/County of Santa Clara.
4. To improve intergovernmental planning by developing 
a workable, coordinated Council agency strategy 
for assisting State and local agencies in imple­
menting a transportation control plan for the 
South Coast Air Basin.
iOJ-U.S. Office of the President, Southwest Federal 
Regional Council: Leadership for Better Government (Wash­
ington , D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973)•
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5. Drawing upon a pilot study in the City of Compton 
and other related Council activies and begin 
implementing in a pilot jurisdiction an interagency 
strategy to reduce the incidence of crime and 
delinquency and to alleviate their adverse social 
effects.
6. To complete the development of a Council strategy 
for implementing the Rural Development Act of 1972.
7. To promote general purpose government planning and 
management capabilities and improve intergovern­
mental exchange of ideas and experiences through 
implementation during Fiscal Year 1974 of an 
inter-local technical assistance program, derived 
from innovative Federal Regional Council and agency 
capacity-building p r o j e c t s . 102
The Federal Regional Council system has generated 
substantial discussion. Some observers believe that there 
is a need to clarify the role which Federal Regional 
Councils play within the American federal system. Ini­
tially the Federal Regional Councils concentrated primarily 
on the improvement of administration of grant-in-aid pro­
grams and all Council members were quite involved in 
assistance to state and local governments. It has been 
suggested that there has been a drift away from the 
coherence which characterized the early activities of the 
Council and to involve them in matters that could be 
handled equally as effectively by other mechanisms, such 
as Federal Executive Boards.
] 02Beau Carter, Staff Director for Region IX 
Federal Regional Council, private interview held at the 
Federal Regional Council Offices in San Francisco, Calif., January, 1974. (This material was taken from an unpublished 
document given to the author at this meeting.)
^®^Dean, op. cit., p.
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The more diffuse the activities of the Councils 
become, the less commonality of interest exists 
among the members. The result could be the evolu­
tion of the Councils into something like Regional 
Federal Executive Boards, useful as forums for dis­
cussion and exchanging information but ineffective 
as devices for program coordination.^^
It has been suggested that there is a need to
strengthen the participation of certain of the member 
agencies now included in the membership of the Councils. 
If the Federal Regional Council is to be an effective 
coordinating body the respective representatives of the 
departments and agencies seated at the Council table must 
be able to commit their organizations to specific courses 
of action or, at least, must be able to secure a commit­
ment from the agency without undue delay. However, such 
has not been the case. Some of the agencies have not 
placed field officials on the Council with the sophisti­
cation and authority to make an effective contribution 
to the affairs of the Council. The Departments of Agri­
culture, Interior and Transportation have all been criti­
cized for being represented on the Council by ineffective 
Regional Directors, or in the case of the Department of 
Transportation, an ineffective Secretarial Representative 
Another criticism of Federal Regional Councils is 
the lack of member agency decentralization, which is of
^Q\ b i d .
^°^Ibid., p. 10.
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course, related to the previously mentioned criticism of 
participation. Where there is a lack of decentralization 
on the part of a member agency, the agency field staff 
find it quite difficult to contribute effectively on the 
Council. Frequently the agencies, which they represent, 
have retained necessary program authority in their 
Washington headquarters and have refused to place with 
regional field officials the delegations needed for 
cooperative action with the regional representatives of 
other agencies. Although decentralization has theoreti­
cally been stressed as a crucial reform objective from 
the beginning of the Federal Assistance Review Program,
much remains to be achieved in several of the Council 
106agencies.
The stages of decentralization of agencies 
making up the Federal Regional Councils are quite varied. 
Some agencies have granted substantial autonomy to 
their regional offices, while other agencies have decen­
tralized very little. As yet, one observer points out, 
the Office of Management and Budgeting has not "cracked 
the whip" to force a faster pace of decentralization.
It has been suggested that one of the reasons that more 
effectiveness has not been demonstrated by the Federal
106t- . j  ,  ,Ibid., p. 11.
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Regional Councils is that uneven degrees of member 
agency decentralization have allowed the regional coun­
cil members to act in harmony in only few and isolated
107minor instances.
The most decentralized of the departments and
agencies is the Department of Housing and Urban Develop­
ment, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Office 
of Economic Opportunity. "Each of their regional directors 
have independent sign-off authority and they are given a 
great deal of discretion in determining how programs are 
run." These three agencies are effectively decentralized 
to the extent that their regional directors can commit
their agencies to whatever course of action the Council
 ̂ 4 4. 1 108 decides to take.
Another typo of decentralization is found in the
Department of Labor and the Department of Transportation.
Although the regional director of the Department of Labor
has no line authority over grants, "there is enough implicit
authority in the position that he can adequately perform
his responsibilities with the C o u n c i l . T h e  Department
of Transportation's representative, like the Department
107 Timothy Ü. Clark, "New Federalism Report;
Nixon Seeks to Decentralize Management of Domestic Pro­
grams," National Journal, V (March, April, 1973)i p . $80.
lo3 Kolberg, op. cit., p. 53.
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of Labor, has no authority over the agency’s operating 
programs, however, he ’’can make things happen. " H O
The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 
representative on the Council directs a bloc grant system. 
This power over some important planning grants allows 
him to play a relatively significant role on the Council. 
Health Education and Welfare is the most centralized of 
all the agencies. Its attempts to decentralize have 
been minimal in relation to its capacity to decentralize. 
Since Health Education and Welfare is the largest spending 
agency in the federal government, it is obviously quite 
important that Health Education and Welfare does decen­
tralize in order for the Federal Regional Council arrange­
ment to be effective.
Another problem of the Council system is staffing. 
There has been excessive turnover in staff directors who 
generally are brought in by the current chairman. Since 
the chairman usually serves approximately a year the 
Councils have suffered greatly from staff leadership dis­
continuity. Some of the professional staff supplied by 
member agencies have at times lacked competence, leadership 
and dedication to the purpose of the C o u n c i l . S o m e  
writers think that one of tlie primary problems that
llOlbid., p. 54.
illlbid.
112 Dean, op. cit., p. 11
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Federal Regional Councils face is a lack of adequate
supergrade personnel supplied by menibej' agencies and
113departments on the Councils. ' Without adequate super­
grade personnel the Council staff in the field tend to 
be viewed by Washington bureaucrats as minor officials. 
This view weakens the role the Councils can play in coor­
dinating grants-in-aid.
A frequent criticism of the Council organization 
is that the personality of the chairman is crucial to 
the Council's effectiveness. To date there has been sub­
stantial variation in the performance of Chairman, and 
consequently the Council waxes or wanes according to the 
personality of who happens to be chairman at the time.^^* 
Since July, 1973, the Under Secretaries Group has been 
experimenting in two Federal regions (Chicago and 
Denver) with a full time Chairman concept. The intent 
is to determine if more time devoted by the Chairman 
can facilitate the Federal Regional Councils' perfor­
mance in interagency and intergovernmental affairs and 
upgrade management of the Council process.
Some writers question if the Councils can be 
effective as they are now organized. The feasibility 
of making coordinated behavior dependent upon the
113 Ink, op. cit.
114Dean, op. cit. , p. 12,
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consensual agreement of the parties to be coordinated is
seriously questioned. The Council is barred from taking
a position which it can seek to enforce with its indi­
ll 5vidual members.'
The Council is enjoined by the Bureau of the Budget 
memorandum of January l4, 1970, from injecting new 
operating and decision-making points into the 
system, nor to assume authority or responsibility 
now lodged in the individual agencies or existing 
coordinating mechanisms.
The net result of this situation is that the 
Council establishes an interagency arena in which member 
agencies can identify conflicting policies and practices 
which should be coordinated. However, the Council is 
not authorized to go further.
The literature of coordination suggests that in 
a situation where there is no collective authority or 
authority supra to the Council agencies, a natural bar­
gaining situation will be established. "In effect. Agency 
'A' will accommodate its behavior to Agency 'B ' if
Agency 'A' receives something in return from Agency 'B'
117or one of the other agencies on the Council."
It has been maintained that the current state-of- 
the-art of Council coordination is perceived as functional




by those who control departmental decision making in 
Washington, and that a weak council is conducive to chaos 
which supports pluralism. In effect, the construction 
of a weak council is no accident. The current structure 
has powerful allies, both bureaucratic and ideological, 
and these allies may continue to block the construction 
of a stronger council.
It has been pointed out that those pleased with 
the current Council system will point out many minor 
useful activities of the Council, for example, joint 
technical assistance to communities and joint use of 
audits; however, these activities do not test the weak­
ness in the authority structure of the Council. Although 
in a few instances council members may counter their 
agency loyalties and go along with a Council decision on 
a minor issue, one should not make too much of this devel­
opment. There are two cases when the influence of the 
Council as a small culture valuing cooperation breaks
119down.
One occurs when Council members come to feel that 
they are being asked to engage in behavior which 
compromises their agency's interests, and there­
fore refuse to commit themselves to the contemplated 
action. The other arises when the Council member 
tentatively commits himself to the collective action,
^^®Ibid., p. 237. 
^^^Ibid.
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and then back in his ô vn agency, surrounded by the 
expectations of another "culture* finds it neces­
sary to retrench on his prior commitment to commonaction.
These two instances of breakdown manifest the primary 
flaws in the authority structure of the Council. Under 
the present arrangement there is an unfortunate likeli­
hood that Councils will refrain from developing agenda 
items on which consensus cannot be expected. Some 
authors advocate aggressive Washington action in helping 
to determine Council agenda items where local Councils 
habitually avoid dealing with interagency conflict.
Under the present system of uneven departmental decen­
tralization, it is suggested a continued crucial role 
be played by the Office of Management and Budget. The 
Office of Management and Budget representative is espe­
cially functional in interpreting to Washington agency
headquarters the meaning and wisdom of Regional Council
, . . 121decisions.
In response to increasing public and congres­
sional concern with the Federal Regional Councils' role 
in administering Federal Programs the General Accounting 
Office reviewed the activities of the Councils to deter­
mine what they had accomplished. The General Accounting
l^Oibid.
1 PI Ibid., p. 238.
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Office concentrated its work to the Atlanta, Boston, 
Chicago and Seattle federal regions.
The following is a list of some of the major 
findings and conclusions of the General Accounting 
Office study. Most officials of States and larger local 
units of government knew about the Councils and their 
purposes; however, the extent of their knowledge and 
experience with the Councils varied widely. Representa­
tives of smaller units of local government generally 
were unfamiliar with the Councils. State and local 
governments need additional information on Federal 
grant-in-aid programs and on the opportunities for 
securing assistance from the Councils. The limited 
staff resources available to Councils as well as the 
Councils brief experience in operating intergovern­
mental programs contribute to State and local government 
lack of knowledge of Federal grant-in-aid programs. Pro­
grams such as Integrated Grant Administration, as imple­
mented by the Councils, helped State and local govern­
ments to coordinate the administration of some Federal 
grant-in-aid programs. These programs, however, were
experimental in nature and reached only a very small
122percentage of potential recipients.
122U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, 
Report to the Congress; Assessment of Federal Regional 
Councils (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1974), p. 1 .
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The General Accounting Office study considered 
that the Councils were impeded from being more effective 
because of the following reasons; member agencies* lack 
of, or variation in, decentralized decision-making 
authority; limit on the authority of the chairmen; divi­
sion of time and effort by Council members, staffs, and 
task force members between Council and agency affairs; 
insufficient participation by nonmember Federal agencies 
in Councils' activities; and absence of formalized




Part I ; Attitudes of City Officials toward the Perfor­
mance of Federal Regional Councils
The research framework utilized for Chapter III
of this study is taken from the policy analysis litera-
124ture. Various independent variables are cross tabu­
lated against dependent variables to determine the
] 24See Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and 
the Public (Chicago; Rand McNally, 1955); Richard I. 
Hofferbert, "Elite Influence in Policy Formation: A
Model for Comparative Inquiry" (Paper delivered at the 
1968 meeting of the American Political Science Associa­
tion, Washington, D.C.); Robert Lineberry, "Community 
Structure and Planning Commitment; A Note on the Cor­
relates of Agency Expenditures," Social Science Quar­
terly , L (December, I969) , 723-30; Louis A. Froman, "An 
Analysis of Public Policies in Cities," Journal of Poli­
tics, XXIX (February, I967), 94-108; Robert C. Wood, T400 
Governments (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books,
1981); Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone, "Policy Maps of 
City Councils and Policy Outcomes: A Developmental
Analysis," American Political Science Review, LXII (March, 
1968), 124-^31 Brett W. Hawkins and Thomas R. Dye, 
"Metropolitan Fragmentation; A Research Note," Midwest 
Review of Public Administration, XIV (February, 1970), 17- 
24 ; A1an K . Campbell and Seymour Sacks, Metropolitan 
America : Fiscal Patterns and Governmental Systems (New
York; Free Press, 1957); Thomas R. Dye, "City-Suburban 
Social Distance and Public Policy," Social Forces, XLIV 
(September, 1965)5 IOO-O6 ; Robert Eyestone and Heinz 
Eulau, "City Councils and Policy Outcomes; Developmental 
Profiles," in City Politics and Public Policy, ed. James Q. 
Wilson (New York; Wiley, I968).
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impact, if any, selected socioeconomic and governmental 
structure variables have on the attitudes of city offi­
cials concerning the performance of Federal Regional 
Councils.
Explanation of Independent Variables 
The governmental structure variables utilized for 
purposes of this research are; percent of city employees 
on a merit system; city manager or mayoral form of govern­
ment; partisan or nonpartisan form of government; at-large 
or ward selection of council members; method utilized in 
mayoral selection; total city reform score, and access to
a grant officer. These government structure variables are
125quite obviously taken from the literature on reformism
See Brett ¥. Hawkins, Politics and Urban Poli­
cies (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.,
1971); John H. Kessel, "Government Structure and Politi­
cal Environment: A Statistical Note about American
Cities," American Political Science Review, LVI (September, 
1962), 615-2O; Raymond E. Wolfinger and John Osgood Field, 
"Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," 
American Political Science Review, LX (June, I966) ,
306-26 ; Robert R. Alford and Harry M. Scoble, "Political 
and Socioeconomic Characteristics of American Cities," 
in Municipal Yearbook (Chicago: International City
Managers' Association, I965) , 82-97; Daniel N. Gordon, 
"Immigrants and Urban Governmental Form in American 
Cities, 1933-1960," American Journal of Sociology, LXX 
(September, I968) , I58-7I ; Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P, 
Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," 
American Political Science Review, LXI (September, 1967), 
701-16 ; Phillips Outright, "Nonpartisan Electorial Systems 
in American Cities," Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, L (January, 1963) , 212-26 ; and Brett W. Hawkins,
"A Note on Urban Political Structure, Environment, and 
Political Integration," Polity, II (Fall, I969), 32-48.
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as it relates to municipal governmental institutions, or 
"culture studies," a rubric under which such studies are 
frequently classified.
The socioeconomic variables utilized in analyzing 
cities surveyed for purposes of this study are: population
of city; per capita income; median income; median educa­
tional level; number of families making less than $3,000 
yearly; extent of unemployment; and the federal region 
in which the responding city is located.
Explanation of Dependent Variables
The dependent variables utilized in this study are: 
the extent of acquaintance city officials have with the 
Federal Regional Council System; the frequency of contact 
city officials have with Councils vis-a-vis other sources 
of grant information and/or assistance; the extent of posi­
tive attitudes held by city officials toward Federal 
Regional Council performance; and an evaluation of Council 
performance by city officials concerning effectiveness of 
contact relating to gaining general information, and problem 
solving vis-à-vis other sources of grant information and/or 
assistance. The "other sources" employed by this research 
are: congressmen and senators, direct communication to
Washington, Council of Government, and the district federal 
office.
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Part II; Attitudes of Federal Regional Council Members
The research design utilized for Chapter IV is an 
analytical framework concerning Council members’ attitudes 
toward selected phases of Council performance. Four prin­
cipal aspects are explored for the purpose of this study: 
members’ attitudes toward Council service to cities; atti­
tudes relating to the frequency with which cities consult 
Federal Regional Councils for grant information and/or 
assistance; attitudes concerning decentralization of Coun­
cil member agencies and departments; and attitudes con­
cerning problems relating to authority and coordination.
Part III: Hypotheses
Since the Federal Regional Council system has 
been implemented quite recently little survey research 
has been done in this area. Most of the research on 
Councils has been in the nature of theoretical analyses 
of the Councils' intent, role and organization. Little 
work, aside from the General Services Administration 
study, has been done in either surveying the recipients 
of Council services or the members of the Councils. This 
study makes a contribution in this area.
The research hypotheses are tested in order to 
seek answers to these principal research questions: Do
city officials believe that Federal Regional Councils have 
assisted them with federal grants? Are city socioeconomic
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and/or government structure variables related to the atti­
tudes that respective city officials hold toward Federal 
Regional Councils? Do Federal Regional Council members 
believe the Council is adequately assisting cities with 
grants? What do the Council members think are major 
problems of the Council which inhibit its effectiveness? 
The hypotheses that follow have been formulated to examine 
the attitudes of city officials toward Federal Regional 
Council performance, and to determine the nature of atti­
tudes of Council members concerning the performance of 
the organization.
Hypotheses Relating to City Officials' Attitudes 
Toward the Performance of the Federal Regional 
Council in Their Region
1. Urban reform institutions are positively asso­
ciated with the extent of acquaintance city officials 
have with Federal Regional Councils.
2. Urban reform institutions are positively asso­
ciated with frequency of contact made by city officials 
with Federal Regional Councils vis-à-vis other sources of 
grant information or assistance.
3. Urban reform institutions are positively asso- 
eicited with effectiveness ratings of Federal Regional 
Councils vis-à-vis other grant sources concerning effec­
tiveness and frequency of contact.
4. Urban reform institutions are positively asso­
ciated with the extent city officials hold positive atti­
tudes toward Federal Regional Councils.
5- Magnitude of population is the primary socio­
economic variable positively associated with the level 
of acquaintance cities have with Federal Regional Councils,
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6. Magnitude of population is the primary socio­
economic variable positively associated with the frequency 
of contact city officials have with Councils.
7. Magnitude of population is the primary socio­
economic variable positively associated with effective­
ness and frequency ratings of Councils vis-à-vis other 
sources concerning solving a grant problem.
8. Magnitude of population is the primary socio­
economic variable positively associated with positive 
attitudes city officials hold toward Federal Regional 
Councils.
Hypotheses Relating to Council Members' 
Attitudes Toward the Performance of 
Federal Regional Councils
1. Members believe the Federal Regional Council 
members have a greater sensitivity to the needs of local 
officials than do Washington bureaucrats.
2. Members believe the Federal Regional Council 
is contacted on a regular basis by city officials seeking 
information and/or assistance with grants.
3. Council members perceive that one of the 
organization's primary problems is a lack of sufficient 
decentralization of member departments and agencies.
4. Council members think a stronger coordination 
mechanism would facilitate the Council's effectiveness.
Part IV. Setting
This study analyzes three Federal Regional Coun­
cils and a sample of their respective service recipients 
These Councils are located in San Francisco, Federal
Region IX; Dallas, Federal Region VI; and New York City, 
Federal Region II. The foregoing Federal regions were 
selected for purposes of this study because they repre­
sented Councils serving urban regions on the East and
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West coasts, and in South-Central United States. It is 
assumed that the selection of these three areas for 
survey purposes provides an element of geographical and 
cultural balance to the study. Research is conducted to 
ascertain the nature of attitudes held by recipient city 
officials and Council members concerning Council perfor­
mance. The research is divided into three phases.
The first phase of research involves a question­
naire survey of city officials within the thi-ee selected 
Federal regions. The questionanires (see appendix) were 
designed to elicit attitudes of these officials concerning 
Federal Regional Councils as effective instruments of 
grant administration. All cities in Standard Federal 
Regions IX, VI, aaid II with a population of 50,000^“^ and 
above were sent questionnaires. A questionnaire Wtis sent
to the mayor of mayor-form cities and conversely to the
127city manager of manager form cities. In the analysis
of questionnaire data obtained from city officials, environ­
mental and institutional variables are cross tabulated 
against these officials’ attitudes to determine what 
impact, if any, selected socioeconomic and governmental
126The categorization of Municipal Yearbook was 
utilized for purposes of determining the magnitude of popu­
lation and delineating type of urban institutions. See 
International City Management Association, The Municipal 
Year Book, 197^ (Washington, D.C.: ICMA, 197^0 • *
l^^Ibid.
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structure variables have on the attitudes of city offi­
cials toward the Federal Regional Council in their region. 
The second phase of research consists of a questionnaire 
(see appendix) which was sent to each of the nine members 
of the three selected Federal Regional Councils to deter­
mine their attitudes toward Council performance. The 
third phase of research consists of interviews of the 
members and certain personnel of two of the three selected 
Councils.
Questionnaires Sent to the Cities 
The population magnitude of $0,000 was used as a 
demarcation point for this research because of an obvious 
necessity to limit the scope of the study. The Bureau of 
the Census' definition of "Standard Metropolitan Statis-
128tical Area" was utilized as the demarcation point for 
purposes of this study.
The distribution of questionnaires sent to city 
officials is as follows; Sixty-two questionnaires were 
sent to Region IX; thirty-five to Region VI; and seven­
teen to Region II. One hundred and fourteen question­
naires were sent to city officials in all. Of this total 
number sent, thirty-six were received from Region IX,
128John C . Ballens and Henry J. Schmandt, The 
Metropolis: Its People, Politics, and Economic Life (New
York; Harper and Row, 1970), p\ 2^
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twenty-five were received from Region VI, and seven were 
received from Region II. Of the total sample, Region IX 
cities comprise 52.9 percent of the sample, Region VI 
cities comprise 36.8 percent, and Region II cities com­
prise 10.3 percent. For purposes of cross tabulation it 
was necessary that Regions IX and II be consolidated to 
give a combined total of forty-three respondents. This 
combination reflects the attitudes of city officials on 
the East and West coasts vis-a-vis the attitudes of city 
officials in the South Central United States.
Further explanations of demarcations made for cross 
tabulation purposes are as follows; The "percent of city 
employees on a merit system" variable was broken down into 
two parts: (l) 0-95 percent of city employees on a merit
system, (2) 96 percent or more on a merit system. Twenty- 
five of the responding cities had 0-95 percent of city 
employees on a merit system. Thirty-seven had 96 percent 
or more. Six could not be ascertained.
The "city manager, mayor or commission form of 
government" variable obtained these different responses. 
Fifty-four responding cities were city manager. Twelve, 
were mayoral. Two were commission cities.
Concerning the "grant liaison officer" variable,
the responses received were as follows. Thirty-six 
cities had access to a grant liaison officer. Thirty-one
did not. One did not answer the question.
68
The ’’partisan/nonpartisan" variable responses 
broke do\m as follows. Fifty-seven cities possessed a 
partisan system. Eleven did not.
The "at-large or ward selection of city council 
members" variable obtained these responses. Fifty-one 
respondents had an at-large selection system. Seventeen 
utilized a ward selection method.
Concerning the "method utilized for the selection 
of the mayor" variable the responses were as follows: 
nineteen cities' mayoral selection process was by the 
city council; forty-eight were selected by the electorate, 
One city did not respond.
A "reform score" was obtained by combining five 
reform institution variables. These variables are:
(1) What percentage of city employees are on a merit 
system? (2) Is the city nonpartisan? (3) Does the city 
possess a city manager form of government? (4) Are the 
city council members selected by an at-large method?
(5) Is the mayor selected by the city council?
Aside from the merit system score, one hundred 
points were given to each positive response. The merit 
system score was recorded as it was listed on the ques­
tionnaire, that is, a city having 70 percent of its 
employees on a merit system was given a score of "70."
If hypothetically that city possessed three other reform 
institutions, the city would score "370" on the reform
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score. A city could theoretically have a total score of 
500 if it possessed all of the previously mentioned reform 
institutions and had one hundred percent of its employees 
on a merit system; or, conversely, a city could have a 
total of "O'* if it did not possess any of these reform 
institutions. For purposes of cross tabulation three 
points of demarcation were made in relation to the reform 
score. (1) 0-299, (2) 300-399, (3) 400-500. The responses 
broke down as follows. Eighteen cities had a reform score 
in the 0 to 299 range. Twenty-two cities had a reform 
score in the 300-399 range. Twenty-four cities had a 
total reform score in the 400-500 range. Four cities did 
not respond.
The "magnitude of population" variable is broken 
down into two categories: (1) 50,000 to 250,000 in popu­
lation, and (2) 250,000 or more in population. Fifty-two 
cities were in the 50,000 to 250,000 range. Sixteen 
cities were in the 250,000 or more range.
"Per capita income" of the city is designated as 
follows: (1 ) S3,500 or less; and (2) more than 13,500.
Forty-two cities fell in the S3,500 or less range. 
Twenty-three fell in the more than $3,500 range. Three 
cities have no response.
The "median income" of the city variable is cate­
gorized as follows: (1) 10,000 or less; and (2) more
than 10,000. Thirty-two cities were in the 10,000 or
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less range. Thirty-three were in the more than 10,000 
range. Three cities have no response.
The "rate of unemployment" variable is designated 
as follows: (1) 4.9 percent or less; and (2) 5*0 percent
or more. Thirty-four cities were in the 4.9 percent or 
less range. Thirty-one cities were in the 5*0 percent or 
more range. Three cities have no response.
The "families making less than $3,000 yearly" 
variable is broken do\m as follows: (l) 8.9 percent or
less; and (2) 9*0 percent or more. Thirty-six cities 
responded in the 8.9 percent oi' less range. Twenty-nine 
cities responded in the 9*0 percent or more range. Three 
cities have no response.
Questionnaires Sent to Federal Regional Councils 
Each Regional Director or departmental represen­
tative of the national agency or department on the Coun­
cil in the three selected Federal regions were sent ques­
tionnaires to determine their attitudes concerning Council 
performance (see appendix). Consequently nine question­
naires were sent to each of the three Councils. Of this 
number one was received from Federal Region IX, seven 
were received from Region VI, and three were received from 
Region II. Of the twenty-seven questionnaires sent to 
the three Councils, thirteen were completed and returned. 
Three questionnaires were received without regional desig­
nation.
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Frequencies are listed in Chapter IV which desig­
nate the extent of agreement or disagreement Federal 
Regional Council members have concerning the performance 
of their respective Councils. These responses are divided 
into three areas of comparison; attitudes toward Council 
service to cities; attitudes concerning decentralization 
of Council member agencies and departments; and attitudes 
concerning problems relating to Council coordination and 
authority.
It was hypothesized that if there were no impor­
tant differences in Council members' attitudes the 
responses would be relatively evenly distributed between 
agree and disagree responses. Thus, hypothetically, if 
ten Council members responded to a particular question, 
and there was no significant difference in their attitudes, 
one would anticipate five responses with agree designa­
tion and conversely five responses with disagree desig­
nation. On the other hand, if Council members responded 
overwhelmingly for either the agree or disagree response 
one would assume that such overall agreement is meaningful. 
A Chi-square statistical test was run on the basis on the 
foregoing hypothesis to determine if there was a signifi­
cant difference in the opinions of Council members in 
relation to the selected research items.
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The following questionnaire items are listed 
according to the area in which they are utilized for pur­
poses of explanation.
I . Council Members * Attitudes Concerning Council
Service to Cities
1. Most city managers of cities over 50,000 popula­
tion within your region have working contacts 
with the Federal Regional Council,
2. This Federal Regional Council makes an effort to 
keep city managers within the region familiar 
with Council programs that relate to urban needs.
3. This Federal Regional Council has sponsored 
meetings for city officials in the region.
4. The Federal Regional Council allows federal offi­
cials in the region a closer working arrangement 
with city officials than these local officials 
had with Washington bureaucrats prior to formula­
tion of the Council arrangement.
5. Federal Regional Council members have a greater 
sensitivity to the needs of local governments in 
their region than do Washington bureaucrats.
6. The Federal Regional Council is becoming more 
institutionalized and accepted by local officials 
as the place where the decisions on program 
approval and implementation are made.
7. On the average Federal Regional Councils are of 
little assistance to cities in the grant process 
except when a grant in question relates to several 
different agencies on the Council.
8. If a city official has a question concerning a 
grant that is handled by a specific federal 
agency he is usually better served by contacting 
the related district federal office rather than 
the Federal Regional Council.
9. Federal Regional Councils expedite the grant 
process when the grant relates to several dif­
ferent agencies.on the Council.
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10. The Federal Regional Council has been very suc­
cessful in achieving its stated purpose of program 
coordination.
11. This Federal Regional Council is consulted on a 
regular basis by city officials seeking general 
information about federal grants.
12. This Federal Regional Council is consulted fre­
quently by city officials seeking specialized 
assistance with grant-in-aid problems.
II. Council Members' Attitudes Concerning Decentraliza­
tion of Council Member Agencies and Departments
1. One of the principal problems of the Federal 
Regional Council is lack of sufficient decen­
tralization of member departments and agencies.
2. If the same amount of line authority were 
granted to each of the Federal Regional Council 
members within their respective agencies, the 
Council would be able to perform its functions 
more effectively than at the present.
3. Those Federal Regional Council members who have 
more line authority usually play a more effec­
tive role on the Council than those members who 
have less line authority.
4. Individual members of the Federal Regional Coun­
cil find it necessary to frequently clear up 
problems by passing them to the Washington level.
III. Council Members * Attitudes Concerning Problems
Relating to Authority and Coordination
1. The Federal Regional Council experienced some 
disagreement among its members because of func­
tional agency pressures to avoid compromising 
agency interest.
2. Issues that have a high potential for controversy 
are at times avoided by the Federal Regional 
Council.
3. Since the Federal Regional Council arrangement 
operates by consensus this usually prevents 
Council members from taking effective action--as
74
an organization--on issues in which there is 
considerable conflict among the Council members.
4. In order for Federal Regional Councils to per­
form adequately there must be a stronger coor­
dination mechanism within the Council than now 
exists.
5 . The Office of Management and Budget's role within 
the Council should be increased so that this 
agency can act as a coordinating influence with 
power of enforcement.
6. The Council Chairman should be given line authority 
over other Council members.
7 . A Council Chairman should not have to also serve 
as his agency's regional head because this divides 
his time too much between agency and Council 
duties.
8. The Under Secretaries Group can be characterized 
by permissive management.
9 . This Council operates best when the Under Secre­
taries Group provides clear management direction
and assistance.
10. This Council would operate more effectively if
O.M.B. would assign a full time permanent repre­
sentative here.
11. The absence of formalized standards for planning 
work and reporting progress curtail the effec­
tiveness of this Council.
12. I have observed Council members experiencing 
conflict as a result of functional expectations 
of one's agency contradicting the area coordina­
tion expectations of the Council.
13. In a situation where a Council member is torn 
between the expectations of his agency and the 
expectations of the Council he usually decides 
in favor of his agency.
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Interviews Held with Federal Regional 
Council Representatives and Staff
The author interviewed various Council members 
and staff in two of the three selected Councils. Inter­
views were held in the San Francisco and Dallas Councils. 
These interviews concentrated on the performance of the 
respective Council. Six staff members were interviewed 
in the San Francisco Council, and two directors and three 
staff members were interviewed in the Dallas Council.
Part V. Explanation of Dependent Variables
In order to make the most effective use of the 
data collected, that is, in order to secure the maximum 
information from the data that is possible, the following 
scaling procedure for the dependent variables was devised. 
Four scales have been developed for explanation purposes.
Scale I
Extent of Acquaintance City Officials Have with 
the Federal Regional Council Systems
Three questionnaire items that relate to the 
acquaintance that city officials have with Federal Regional 
Councils are consolidated into an acquaintance scale in 
order to give one an overall perspective of the extent 
city officials are familiar with the Federal Regional 
Council in their area. The items employed in the con­
struction of the acquaintance scale were:
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1. I have personally met with some of the Federal 
Regional Council members.
2. I have attended meetings sponsored by a Federal 
Regional Council.
3. I am familiar with the functions and activities 
of the Federal Regional Council.
In the scoring procedure utilized for obtaining 
an acquaintance score "no" responses are scored "0."
"Yes" responses are scored "1." Thus for the three total 
items that encompass the "extent of acquaintance" scale 
the maximum score that can be obtained from a given 
respondent is "3i" and the minimum score that can be 
obtained from a given respondent is "0." It is obvious 
from the foregoing explanation that the higher the total 
number obtained from a given respondent on the acquaintance 
scale signifies the more familiar that respondent is with 
the operations of the Federal Regional Council in his 
federal region. Conversely the lower the total number 
obtained from a respondent on this score signifies the 
less familiar a respondent is with the Federal Regional 
Council in his region. An analysis of how the respon­
dents scored on the acquaintance continuum is covered in 
Figure 2A.
For purposes of cross tabulation the cases, that 
is, cities responses, were divided into two separate cate­
gories in order to facilitate statistical analysis. 

















figure 2A. Acquaintance Continuum (Scale I)
manner: the mean score was computed, and the mean
obtained from the total cases was utilized as the demarca­
tion point for the data. For example, all cases for 
Scale I had a mean of 2.13. Consequently, each individual 
case which had a Scale X score of less than 2.13 was 
placed in the first category and conversely, all cases 
which had Scale I scores of 2.13 or more were assigned to
the second category. Figure 2B gives an analysis of















Frequency of Contact with Federal Regional Councils
Scale number II consists of one questionnaire
item:
On the average what is your frequency of contact (via 
telephone, letter, personal communication, etc.) with 
Federal Regional Council Officials?
0. Never
1. Once a year or less often
2. Two to three times a year
3. Four to twelve times a year
4. More often than once a month
Responses are scored on a continuum from "0" to
"4." The "0" responses are those officials who have "never"
contacted a Federal Regional Council, and conversely, "4" 
responses denote city officials who have contacted a 
Federal Regional Council "more than once a month."
An analysis of officials' frequency of contact with Coun­






















Figure 2C. Frequency of Contact with Federal 
Regional Council Continuum (Scale II)
For purposes of cross tabulation the responses 
were divided into two categories of scale scores. Cases 
were dichotomized on the basis of the Scale II mean, which
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was 2.04. Each case which had a scale II mean score of 
less than 2.04 was placed in the first category. All cases 
which had a mean score of 2.04 or above were assigned to 
the second category. Figure 2D gives ah analysis of 











Figure 2D. Frequency of Contact Scale: 
Dichotomized by Mean Score
Scale III
Frequency of Contact to Other Sources for Grant 
Information and/or Assistance^
Scale number III consists of four questionnaire 
items. These items are:
1. On the average what is the frequency of contact 
made directly to a Washington federal department 
or agency?
2. On the average what is the frequency of contact 
made with your congressmen or senators in seeking 
information about or assistance with federal grants?
3 . On the average what is the frequency of contact 
made to a Council of Government (C.O.G.) in seeking 
information about or assistance with Federal grants?
4. On the average what is the frequency of contact 
made to your district Federal offices or other 
Federal sub-regional offices (if they exist for 
specific functional areas)?
8o
Responses to each of the preceding questions were 
limited to the following choices:
0. Never
1. Once a year or less often
2. Two or three times a year
3. Four to twelve times a year
4. More often than once a month
The response on each non-Council agency was summed to 
create a total contact score, that is, the more frequent 
the contact with the various agencies the higher the score, 
























Figure 2E. Frequency of Contact Continuum for Non- 
Federal Regional Council Sources (Scale III)
These four responses are consolidated for purposes 
of cross tabulation into a low-high response. The mean 
score for these four items is 11.20. All responses below
11.20 were assigned the first category. All items 11.20 
or above were assigned the second category. The cities' 
response concerning frequency of contact to "other sources" 
of grant information and/or assistance is contrasted with 
the frequency of contact cities have with Federal Regional
8l
Councils. Figure 2F provides an analysis of Scale III 










Figure 2F. Frequency of Contact Scale for Non- 
Federal Regional Council Sources: Dichotomized
by Mean Score
Scale IV
The Extent City Officials Possess Positive 
Attitudes Toward Federal 
Regional Councils
Twelve items on the questionnaire sent to city 
officials related to the extent city officials hold posi­
tive attitudes toward the Federal Regional Council in 
their area. These twelve items are consolidated into a 
"Positive Attitude Scale." The questions employed in the 
construction of this scale are:
1. Federal Regional Councils have expedited the grant 
process for this city.
2. The Federal Regional Council in this region ; 
attempts to keep this city informed about the 
Council's activities and programs that have a 
bearing on urban needs.
3. Federal Regional Councils have reduced the number 
of steps necessary in obtaining a grant.
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4. Federal Regional Council members are more likely 
to respond with action to local needs and problems 
than are bureaucrats in Washington.
5 . Federal Regional Council members have a greater 
sensitivity and awareness of the needs of local 
governments than do Washington bureaucrats.
6. The Federal Regional Council members have coordi­
nated information from their respective agencies 
concerning federal grants for this city when this 
city has made an inquiry for such information.
7 . The members of the Federal Regional Council have 
coordinated the resources of their respective agen­
cies in relation to solving grant problems for this 
city.
8. Federal Regional Councils have reduced the number 
of contacts your city makes with other sources, 
e.g., Congressmen and senators, direct to Washington, 
C.O.G.s, and district federal offices.
9. Agency members of the Federal Regional Council lack 
sufficient authority to make decisions and conse­
quently must frequently clear problems encountered 
on the Council with their department chiefs in 
Washington.
10. Contacts with the Federal Regional Council have 
been beneficial to my city.
11. The best way to characterize Federal Regional Coun­
cils is that they are merely another bureaucratic 
obstacle one faces when he seeks to obtain a 
federal grant.
12. I believe that Federal Regional Councils should 
continue as a permanent part of the federal struc­
ture .
The respondent is scored on a "one" to "five" 
basis for each question on this scale depending on how 




2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
k. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
Those respondents who indicated "1” were recorded 
one score; those who indicated ”2" were recorded two, etc. 
Consequently the maximum score that can be obtained in 
this scale is ”60.” The minimum score that can be obtained 
is ”12.” It is obvious that those officials scoring ”60” 
have negative attitudes toward the Federal Regional Council 
in their area, and conversely those scoring ”12” would have 
the highest positive attitudes toward the Federal Regional 
Council system. For purposes of scoring, questionnaire
items ”9” and ”11” were reversed because they were obvi­
ously originally formulated to elicit city officials' 
attitudes relating to negative vis-à-vis positive Council 
performance. An analysis of the positive attitude con­
tinuum appears in Figure 2G.
Least Most
positive positive











Figure 2G. Positive Attitude Toward Federal Regional 
Council Continuum (Scale IV)
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For purpose of cross tabulation the responses were 
divided into two categories of scale scores. The cases 
were dichotomized by the computed mean obtained from all 
the cases. All cases for scale IV had a mean of 38.9I. 
Consequently each case which had a scale IV score of less 
than 38.91 were placed in the first category and conversely, 
all cases which had scores of 38*91 or more were assigned 
the second category. Figure 2H illustrates scale IV 







Figure 2H. Positive Attitude Toward 
Federal Regional Council Scale; 
Dichotomized by Mean Score
The Ranking of Councils vis-a-vis Other Sources on Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact "
Four questionnaire items comprise the ranking of 
agencies. These items are:
1. In relation to effectiveness of contact how would 
you rank the following access routes for gaining 
general information about available grants on a 
one (1) to five (5) ranking? ((1) being the most 
effective)
2. In relation to effectiveness of contact how would 
you rank the following access routes for solving 
a problem during a grant negotiation on a one (l) 
to five (5) ranking? ((1) being the most effec­
tive)
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3. Rank each of the following access routes on a one 
(1) to five (5) ranking to correspond with fre­
quency of contact you make in relation to seeking 
general information about available grants.
((1) being the most effective)
4. Rank each of the following access routes on a one 
(1) to five (5) ranking to correspond with fre­
quency of contact you make in relation to seeking 
assistance with a grant problem. ((1) being the 
most effective)
The agencies listed under each of these items are; 
Congressmen and senators
Direct contact to Washington '
Federal Regional Council 
Council of Government (C.O.G.)
District federal offices or other federal 
sub-regional offices
Respondents ranked the five agencies on the previously 
mentioned four characteristics. Each agency's overall 
rank was averaged, i.e., a mean agency rank for the com­
bined four characteristics was obtained. Then, city offi­
cials were separated into two groups according to whether 
their average rank for each agency was lower or higher 
than the given agency mean.
The overall mean rankings for the five agencies 
are as follows: direct to Washington 2.6; Federal Regional
Councils 3*9; Congressmen and Senators 2.8; Council of 
Government 3.8; and district federal office 2.0. In 
terms of effectiveness of contact the highest average 
rating went to the district federal office, then direct 
communication to Washington, Congressmen and Senators, 
Council of Government, then Federal Regional Councils.
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Table 2A. Ranking in Terms of Effectiveness and Frequency 
of Contact
Agency MeanRanking
1. District federal office 2.0
2. Direct communication to Washington 2.6
3. Congressmen and Senators 2.8
4. Council of Government 3*8
5« Federal Regional Council 3-9
Part VI. Quantitative Analysis
Quantitative analyses fox' Chapter III were made 
by computer, through the use of the University of 
Michigan, Institute for Social Research's OSIRIS III 
statistical package. This statistical package is "on-line" 
at the University of Oklahoma and v/as obtained by the 
Department of Political Science as a member of the Inter­
university Consortium for Political Research.
The computer file was created with the OSIRIS III 
file build program. Data transformations and scales 
were created with the Index Construction (ICON) program. 
Univariate frequencies, bivariate cross-tabulations, and 
assorted descriptive statistics were obtained with the 
TABLES program.
For a detailed explanation of the OSIRIS III 
package and of the programs used to complete this 
research see Institute for Social Research, Osiris III 
Volume 1; System and Program Description (Arm Arbor; 
University of Michigan, 1973)•
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All cross tabulation results for this research 
utilized the Chi-square statistical test. The Chi- 
square, foi' Chapter III, was computed by the Osiris III 
statistical package TABLES program which automatically 
utilizes the Yates correction factor when such a correc­
tion is appropriate. The .05 level of significance was 
utilized as the demarcation point for all statistical 
tests.
CHAPTER III
ATTITUDES OF SELECTED CITY OFFICIALS TOWARD THEIR 
RESPECTIVE FEDERAL REGIONAI. COUNCILS
This chapter is divided into five parts. It covers 
the extent of acquaintance city officials have with the 
Federal Regional Council in their respective region, the 
frequency of contact city officials have with Councils, 
as well as the effectiveness ratings of selected grant 
access sources, and finally, analyzes the positive atti­
tudes held by city officials toward Federal Regional Coun­
cils .
Part I: City Officials' Acquaintance with Councils
This section analyzes the extent of acquaintance 
city officials have with the Federal Regional Council in 
their Federal region.
Local officials that were surveyed reported a quite 
high degree of acquaintance with the Federal Regional 
Council in their respective Federal areas. Forty-five, or 
nearly 62 percent of the local officials had personally met 
with Federal Regional Council members, while twenty-one, or 
about 31 percent, had not as is indicated in Table 3A.
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Table 3A. Local Official Respondents' Personal Contact 
with Federal Regional Council Members
Personal Contact Number Percent
Contact 4$ 69.1
No Contact 21 30.9
Total N=66 100.0
In addition, forty-two, or approximately 62 percent, 
of the responding local government officials had attended 
meetings sponsored by the Federal Regional Council in their 
area. Table 3B covers the Council attendance record of 
these officials.
Table 3B. Local Official Respondents' Attendance at





The highest response obtained by the local public 
officials relating to their extent of acquaintance with 
Councils was their alleged familiarity with the functions 
and activities of the Councils. Table 3C indicates that 
over 82 percent of the local officials had some familiarity 
with the operations of their Regional Council, while twelve,
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or 17-5 percent, of the respondents did not.
Table 3C. Local Official Respondents' Familiarity with 






One independent variable that was found to be of 
significance at the .05 level or below was the govern­
mental structure reform variable, the possession of a 
city grant liaison officer, which is analyzed in Table 3D.





Council by Presence of a Grant
Grant Liaison Officer
Acquaintance Liaison No Liaison
Number Percent Number Percent
Non-Ac quaintance 11 30.5 19 61.3
Acquaintance 25 69.5 12 38.7
Total N=36 100.0 N=31 100.0
Chi-square = 5.181 P <  .025
Those cities that had access to a grant liaison officer
either in Washington, D.C. or in their local government
demonstrated a significantly high degre e of acquaintance
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with the Council system in their Federal region. A high 
significance level of .025 was ascertained for the grant 
liaison officer in correlation with the acquaintance 
scale. All other independent variables, analyzed in 
Table 3E, were found to be not significant at the standard 
level stated above for the Chi-square measure. One socio­
economic variable worthy of mention, that did not meet the 
.05 level but did exhibit a fairly high significance level 
was low city median income (significance level .06).
Although the prediction that magnitude of population would 
be the primary socioeconomic variable associated with 
acquaintance was not confirmed, nevertheless, high popu­
lation did post a significance level of .20. Other socio­
economic variables and their levels of significance under 
.20 were low per capita income, .10; low median educational 
level, .10; and median income, .06.
Governmental structural variables showed the least 
relationship with extent of acquaintance with Federal 
Regional Councils. Nonpartisan vis-a-vis partisan local 
government, and the percent of city employees in merit system 
achieved significance levels of .99 and .995 respectively.
In summary, the presence of a grant liaison 
officer proved to be of most significance to local offi­
cials’ acquaintance with Federal Regional Councils. Other 
reform variables were not significant at the standard 
Chi-square significance level. No socioeconomic variables
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Table 3E. Acquaintance of Local Official Respondents with
Federal Regional Council by Independent Variables
Independent Variable Chi-square Level of Significance
Government Structure Variables;
Merit System 0.010 P <  .995
Reform Score 2.592 . P <  .30
*Form of Government 1.712 P <  .50
Grant Liaison Officer 5.181 P <  .025
Partisan/Non-Partisan 0.055 P <  .99
At Large-Ward Selection of 
City Council Members 0.318 P <  .90
Method of Selection of Mayor 1.180 P <  .30
Socio-Economic Variables:
Population 2.171 P <  .20
Per Capita Income 2.856 P <r .10
Median Education 2.740 P .10
Families with Income 
Below Poverty Level 1.498 P .25
Region of Federal Regional 
Council 0.600 P -<■ . 45
Median Income 3.553 P <  .06
Unemployment.Level 0.112 P <- .80
*Ten percent or more of the computed expected 
frequencies for each cell were less than five. '
The Yates' Correction Method was employed to com­
pute the Chi-Square of the above correlations when appli­
cable.
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tested were of significance at the .05 level although low 
city median income posted a .06 significance level.
Table 3E gives a complete listing of the Chi-square test 
results and the corresponding levels of significance for 
each of the independent variables to the acquaintance level 
of local officials with the Federal Regional Council.
Part II. Frequency of Contact with Federal Regional 
Councils
Another area of interest is the frequency of con­
tact local officials have with their respective Federal 
Regional Council officials. This is then followed in 
Part III with an analysis of the frequency of contact that 
local officials have with other sources of grant informa­
tion and/or assistance.
The frequency with which Federal Regional Councils 
are consulted by city officials is examined in detail in 
Table 3F. Table 3G then divides the detailed responses 
into high and low categories. The responses, more often 
than once a month, and four to twelve times a year are 
consolidated into a high category. Two to three times a 
year, once a year or less often, and never are consolidated 
into a low category. This procedure is followed for each 
of the five sources.
Table 3F clearly indicates that the frequency with 
which local officials consult with their Federal Regional 
Council is low for as many as 63 percent, who show three
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Table 3F. Frequency of Contact with a Federal Regional 
Council
Number Percent
More Often than Once a Month 11 16.2
Four to Twelve Times a Year 14 20.6
Two to Three Times a Year 17 25.0
Once a Year or Less Often 19 27.9
Never 7 10.3
or less contacts in a year. The remainder. with four or
more contacts a year, appear to have! established more of
a continuing working relationship.
Table 30. The Frequency of Contact of Local 
with Federal Regional Councils
Officials
Frequency of Contact Number Percent
Low Frequency 43 63.2
High Frequency 25 36.8
In correlating the local government structure 
variables to the city officials’ frequency of contact with 
Federal Regional Councils, only one structural variable, 
partisan/nonpartisan government, as shown in Table 3H, 
proved to be significant at the .05 level or below. Those 
cities whose officials are elected on a nonpartisan basis 
report a high degree of relationship to the absence of con­
tact with Federal Regional Councils. Conversely, those
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cities whose elected officials are identified by a politi­
cal party demonstrate a high correlation with frequency 
of contact to Federal Regional Councils.
Table 3H. Frequency of Contact of Local Official




Number Percent Number Percent
Low Contact 3 27.3 40 70.2
High Contact 8 72.7 17 29.8
Total N=ll 100.0 N=57 100.0
Chi-square = 5•571 P < . 0 2
Other government structural variables did not meet 
the standard level of statistical significance. It is 
interesting to note, however, that cities with a grant 
liaison officer demonstrate less frequency of contact with 
Federal Regional Councils than those cities who are without 
a liaison (.20 level of significance). Also, city manager 
cities report a correlation with less frequency of contact 
than mayoral cities (.10 level of significance).
Three socioeconomic variables proved to be of 
statistical significance in relationship to local officials 
frequency of contact with Federal Regional Councils. 
Interestingly the higher the median educational level of
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the city the less contact local officials report with 
Federal Regional Councils. This is revealed in Table 31.
Table 31 « Frequency of Contact of Local Official Respon­




12.4 years or less
High Education 
12.5 years or more
Number Percent Number Percent
Low Contact 27 56.2 15 88.2
High Contact 21 43.8 2 11.8
Total N=48 100.0 N=17 100.0
Chi-square = 4.697 P < .Ok
Table 3J shows that those cities that have a low 
poverty level manifested a correlation to less frequent 
contact with Federal Regional Councils.
Another statistically significant variable at the 
.05 level or below is the city median income rank. A high 
relationship is shown in Table 3K between cities whose 
median income is more than $10,000 and a low frequency of 
contact to Federal Regional Councils.
The socioeconomic variable, high population magni­
tude, hypothesized to positively associate with the 
frequency of contact city officials have with Federal 
Regional Councils did not prove to be statistically sig­
nificant at the required level, reporting a .14 level of
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Table 3J. Frequency of Contact of Local Official Respon­
dents with Federal Regional Council by Family 
Poverty Level (Family Yearly Income less than 
$3,000)
Family Poverty Level
Low Poverty Level 
8.9 percent or less 
families making 
$3,000 yearly
High Poverty Level 
9.0 percent or more 
families making 
$3,000 yearly
Number Percent Number Percent
Low Contact 28 77*8 14 48.3
High Contact 8 22.2 15 51.7
Total N=36 100.0 N=29 100.0
Chi-square = 4.892 P <,.04
Table 3K. Frequency of Contact of Local Official Respon­
dents with Federal Regional Councils by Median 






Number Percent Number Percent
Low Contact l6 30.0 26 78.8
High Contact l6 $0.0 7 21.2
Total N=32 100.0 N=33 100.0
Chi-square = 4.697 P < . 0 4
significance. Table 3L gives information regarding the 
results of the Chi-square test and the corresponding levels 
of significance and each of the independent variables and
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Table ^L. Frequency of Contact by Local Official Respondents 
with Federal Regional Council by Independent 
Variables
Independent Variable Chi-Square Level of Significance
Government Structure Variables
Merit System 0.432 p c  .60
Reform Score 1.045 P <  .70
*Form of Government 4.993 P <.10
Grant Liaison Officer 1.771 P <  .20
Par bisan/Non-Partisan 5.571 P <  .02
At Large-Ward Selection 
of City Council Members 0.021 P <  .90
Method of Selection of Mayor 0.545 P < . 5 0
Socioeconomic Variables
Population 2.409 P <  .14
Per Capita Income 0.790 P <  .40
Median Education 4.305 P <  .04
Families with Income 
below Poverty Level 4.892 P <  .04
Region of Federal Regional 
Council 1.450 p c  .25
Median Income 4.697 P <  .04
Unemployment Level 0.059 P c  .90
*Ten percent or more of the computed expected frequencies 
for each cell were less than five.
The Yates* Correction Method was employed to com­
pute the Chi-Square of the above correlations when appli­
cable .
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frequency of contact by local officials with Federal 
Regional Council.
Part III. Frequency of Contact with Grant Access Sources 
Other than the Federal Regional Council
The frequency of contact local government officials
have with other access sources to grant information and/or
assistance is significant. The sources, other than the
Federal Regional Council, that are included in this analysis
are; communication to Washington, D.C., Congressmen and
Senators, Council of Government (C.O.G.), and the official's
district Federal office.
Table 3M makes apparent that over 75 percent of
the city officials responding in this survey generally
maintained rather frequent contact with Federal officials
in Washington, D.C., while the remainder ranged from a
couple to no contacts in a year's time.
Table 3M. Frequency of Contact Direct to Washington, D.C.
Number Percent
More Often than Once a Month 26 38.2
Four to Twelve Times a Year 24 35.3
Two to Three Times a Year 9 13.2
Once a Year or Less Often 8 11.8
Never 1 1.5
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In respect to the frequency of contact made by 
city officials with congressional members, Table 3N shows 
that there is, overall, a slightly lower level of contact 
than in the case of Federal officials.
Table 3N. Frequency of Contact with Congressmen or
Senators in Seeking Information about or Assis­
tance with Federal Grants
Number Percent
More Often than Once a Month 17 25.0
Four to Twelve Times a Year 26 38.2
Two to Three Times a Year 16 23.5
Once a Year or Less Often 8 11.8
Never 1 1.5
The Council of Government does not fair as well 
with city officials for consultation on grant programs as 
do the Washington bureaucrats and politicians. Table 3-0 
shows that only 53 percent had contact with their Council 
of Government four or more times a year as compared to 
73 and 63 percent, respectively, in the case of Washington 
officials and Congressional representatives.
The frequency of contact by city officials shows a 
marked increase in the case of Federal agencies* district 
offices. As indicated in Table 3 P , nearly 53 percent made 
such contact more than once a month, and more than ?6 per­
cent are found in the range of four or more contacts in a 
year.
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Table 3-0. Frequency of Contact to a Council of Govern­
ment in Seeking Information about or Assis­
tance with Grants
Numb er Percent
More Often than Once a Month 15 22.1
Four to Twelve Times a Year 21 30.9
Two to Three Times a Year 13 19.1
Once a Year or Less Often 10 14.7
Never 9 13.2
Table 3P. Frequency of Contact 
Office
to a District Federal
Number Percent
More Often than Once a Month 36 52.9
Four to Twelve Times a Year l6 23.5
Two to Three Times a Year 9 13.2
Once a Year or Less Often 5 7.4
Never 2 2.9
An examination of the frequency with which other 
sources of grant information and/or assistance are con­
sulted by local officials makes apparent that there is com­
paratively a low frequency of contact with Federal Regional 
Councils. In fact, it is the lowest maintained by local 
officials among all the contact agencies.
Tables 3Q through 3T present a general review of 
the frequency of contact by local officials with the
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alternative agencies mentioned above. The highest per­
centage contact rate, at 76.5 percent, was with the Federal 
district office, while the next highest, at 73-3 percent, 
was with the Washington Federal agency. U.S. Senators and 
Representatives were third highest in the rate of fre­
quency of contact by city officials, with 63.2 percent 
falling in the category of high frequency, while the Council 
of Government, at 53 percent high contact, stands as least 
significant to the respondents as a resource for assistance 
among the alternative agencies other than the Federal 
Regional Council.
Table 3Q. Local Official Respondents' Frequency of Con­
tact with District/Subdistrict Office
Frequency of Contact Number Percent
Low Contact I6 23.5
High Contact 52 76.5
Total N=68 100.0
Table 3R. Local Official Respondents' Frequency of Contact 
with Washington Federal Department/Agency
Frequency of Contact Number Percent
Low Contact 18 26.5
High Contact 50 73.5
Tot al N=68 100.0
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Table 3S. Local Official Respondents' Frequency of Con­
tact with U.S. Congress
Frequency of Contact Number Percent
Low Contact 25 36.8
High Contact 43 63.2
Total N=68 100.0
Table 3T. Local Official Respondents' Frequency of Con­
tact with Council of Government (C.O.G.)
Frequency of Contact Number Percent
Low Contact 32 47.0
High Contact 36 53.0
Total N=68 100.0
It was explained in Chapter II that these four 
"other sources" responses are consolidated for purposes 
of cross tabulation into an overall low-high other sources 
ranking. (See Table 2F.)
Magnitude of population, as hypothesized, did corre­
late strongly with frequency of contact by local officials 
with other sources of grant information and/or assistance 
at the .005 significance level. Cities with a population 
of 250,000 or more, covered in Table 3U, exhibited a high 
relationship to a greater frequency of contact with other 
sources by their local officials.
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Table 3U. Frequency of Contact of Local Official Respon­
dents to Other Sources by Population
Population
Low
50,000 to 250,000 
Number Percent
High








1 2 . 5
8 7 . 5
Total N=52 100.0 N=16 100.0
Chi-square = 8.298 P <.005
Another significant relationship is the high 
correlation of e]ected mayor to more frequency of contact 
by local officials to other sources of grant information 
and/or assistance. In Table 3V this correlation recorded 
at .02 level of significance.
Table 3V. Frequency of Contact of Local Official Respon­
















Chi-square = 5.766 P<;.02
The remaining correlation that is significant at the 
.05 level or below is the poverty level of families in the
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selected cities. Table 3W establishes that cities in 
which 9*0 percent or more of the families have a yearly 
income of less than #3,000 show a strong tendency for more 
frequency of contact by local officials with other sources 
of grant information and/or assistance.
Table 3W. Frequency of Contact of Local Official Respon­
dents to Other Sources by Poverty Level of 
Families
Poverty Level of Families
Low Poverty Level 









Low Contact 21 58.3 8 27.6
High Contact 15 41.7 21 72.4
Total n =36 100.0 N=29 100.0
Chi-square = P c.04
Other independent variables reporting a .20 level 
of statistical significance or below are as follows; the 
possession of ci city grant liaison office and high fre­
quency ofT contact with other sources (.08); high reform 
score correlated with low frequency of contact with other 
sources (.20); region of Federal Regional Council, i.e., 
Federal Region VI correlated with high frequency of con­
tacts with other sources (.10); and low median income level 
of a city associated with high frequency of contact to
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other soùrce.3 (.l8). Table 3X shows a complete listing 
of independent variables listed with the Chi-square and 
corresponding level of statistical significance.
Part IV. Effectivehess Ratings of Selected Grant Access 
Sources
In order to complete a comprehensive look at the 
frequency of contact and rated effectiveness of Federal 
Regional Councils relative to their counterparts in the 
Federal system, each city official was requested to rate 
the foregoing sources relative to each other (Table 2-1). 
This research examines in detail the ratings by local offi­
cials of each of the selected agencies in relation to 
frequency of contact in seeking general information; fre­
quency of contact in seeking assistance with a grant 
problem; the effectiveness rating of agencies in gaining 
general information about grants; and effectiveness of 
contact rating in solving a problem. The numbers utilized 
to differentiate effectiveness ratings indicate the mean 
ranking of each agency. The lower the mean ranking achieved 
by a given agency denotes its relative effectiveness vis-a- 
vis the other ranked agencies.
In Table 3Y direct contact to a Washington agency 
appears as the most frequently employed method for seeking 
general information about grants. The Federal Regional 
Councils is the fourth frequently consulted source, placing 
only above Congressmen and Senators.
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Table 3X • Frequency of Contact of Local Official Respon­
dents with Other Sources by Independent Variables
Independent Variable Chi-square Level of Significance
Government Structure Variables
Merit System 1.550 P < .25
Reform Score 4.283 P <  .20
*Form of Government 3.183 P <  .25
Grant Liaison Officer 3.284 P <  .08
Partisan/nonpartisan 0.199 P < .70
At Large-Ward Selection 
of City Council Members 0.079 P <  .80
Method of Selection of Mayor 5.766 P C  .02
Socioeconomic Variables
Population 8.298 P <  .005
Per Capita Income 0.418 P <; . 60
Median Education 0.270 P c  .70
Families with Income 
below Poverty Level 4.964 P <  .04
Region of Federal Regional 
Council 2.706 P <  .10
Median Income 1.921 P <  .18
Unemployment Level 0.695 P C .45
*Ten percent or more of the computed expected frequencies 
for each cell were less than five.
The Yates• Correction Method was employed to com­
pute the Chi-Square test of all the above correlations
when applicable.
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Table 3Y. Frequency of Contact Rating; Seeking General 
Information
Direct to Washington 1.42
Federal District Office 1.49
Council of Government 1.62
Federal Regional Council 1.64
Congressmen or Senators 1.74
Some change occurs in the ratings, as is shown in 
Table 3%, when local officials seek assistance with a grant 
problem. They most frequently turn to the Federal district 
office for such help, followed by direct contact to Wash­
ington. The Federal Regional Council again rates fourth, 
in this case above the Council of Government.
Table 3Z. Frequency of Contact Rating: Seeking Assistance
with a Grant Problem
Federal District Office 1.46
Direct to Washington 1.46
Congressmen and Senators 1.58
Federal Regional Council 1.67
Council of Government 1.73
The ratings of agencies change again when tested 
for effectiveness of contact, covered in Table 3AA. Local 
officials think that direct communication to a Washington 
agency is the most effective means of gaining general
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information about available grants. The Federal Regional 
Council was the last agency local officials would turn to 
for gaining information about available grants.
Table 3AA. Effectiveness of Contact Rating: Gaining
General Information about Available Grants
Direct to Washington 1.48
Federal District Office 1.52
Council of Government 1.55
Congressmen and Senators 1.63
Federal Regional Council 1.68
When rating the agencies for effectiveness of con­
tact in solving a problem, shown in Table 3B8, a close 
comparison occurs with the ratings in Table 3Z, showing 
frequency of contact in seeking assistance with a grant 
problem. One can hypothesize that the effectiveness at an 
agency level in solving a problem determines the frequency 
that local officials will make contact for such assistance, 
In this respect the Federal district office is considered 
by city officials as the most effective agency for solving 
a grant problem. Direct contact to Washington is rated 
second, and Congressmen and Senators third. The Federal 
Regional Councils do not fare so well with a low fourth in 
the ratings.
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Table 3BB. Effectiveness of Contact Rating; Solving a 
Problem
Federal District Office 1.45
Direct to Washington 1.49
Congressmen and Senators 1.51
Federal Regional Council 1.68
Council of Government 1.76
Table 3CC reveals that the only meaningful correla­
tion at the .05 level of significance or below is the 
relationship of the effectiveness of contact with Federal 
Regional Councils and the method of selection of city 
council members--at large or ward selection. The higher 
the rating of Federal Regional Councils by local officials 
may be related to at-large selection of city council mem­
bers, or more importantly ward selection seems to elicit a 
low effectiveness rating of Federal Regional Councils.
One observes in Table 3DD that two variables were 
essentially unrelated, significant only at the .95 level: 
form of government and the method of mayoral selection. 
This table also gives a complete listing of correlations 
between Federal Regional Council ratings and independent 
variables.
For correlations involving U.S. Congress and its 
effectiveness rating of independent variables there were 
no significant relationships at the .05 level. However
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Table 3CC. Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating 
of Local Official Respondents with Federal 
Regional Council by Selection Method of City 
Council Members
■ Selection Method of City Council
At ~Large Ward
Number Percent Number Percent
Low Rating 19 48.7 14 100.0
High Rating 20 51.3 0 0
Total N=39 100.0 N=l4 100.0
Chi-square = 9.451 P<.005
there were three interesting correlations: mayoral form
of government associates with a high U.S. Congress rating 
(.10); ward selection of city council members associates 
with a high rating (.05); and a low unemployment level 
associates with a high Congress rating (.18) . Table 5EE 
gives a complete table on effectiveness and frequency of 
contact rating of Congress by independent variables.
As one might anticipate, due to the close proximity 
of a Washington based grant liaison officer, and the spe­
cialization of such an officer, there appears to be a 
high coj: relation (.02 level of significance) between the 
high effectiveness and frequency of contact rating of 
city officials with the Washington Federal office when 
the city in question has a grant liaison officer on its 
staff. Table 3FF indicates this relationship.
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Table 3DD. Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating
of Local Official Respondents with Federal
Regional Council by Independent Variables
Independent Variable Chi-Square Level of Significance
Government Structure Variables
Merit System 0.899 P <  .35
Reform Score 1.4l6 P c  .50
*Form of Government 3.819 P <  .20
Grant Liaison Officer 0.013 P <  .95
Partisan/Nonpar tisan 1.564 P <  .25
At Large-Ward Selection of City Council Members 9.451 P <  .005
Method of Selection of Mayor 0.005 P ^  .95
Socioeconomic Variables
Population 0.857 P <  .35
Per Capita Income 0.362 P <c . 60
Median Education 0.189 P <  .70
Families with Income below 
Poverty Level 1.013 P C  .35
Region of Federal Regional 
Council 0.833 P <  .40
Median Income 0.357 P c  .60
Unemployment Level 0.166 P c  .70
*Ten percent or more of the computed expected frequencies 
for each cell were less than five.
The Yates' correction method was employed to com­
pute the Chi-Square test of all the above correlations when
applicable.
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Table 3EE. Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating
of Local Official Respondents with U.S. Congress
by Independent Variables
Independent Variable Chi-Square Level of Significance
Government Structure Variables
Merit System 0.086 P -c .80
Reform Score 0.818 P <  .70
*Forin of Government 5.005 P <  .10
Grant Liaison Officer 0.405 P <■ .60
Partisan/Nonpartisan 0.733 P <  .40
At Large-Ward Selection of 
City Council Members 3.752 P <  .06
Method of Selection of Mayor 0.232 P <  .70
Socioeconomic Variables
Population 0.055 P <  .90
Per Capita Income 0.012 P <  .95
Median Education 0.018 P tr .90
Families with Income Below 
Poverty Level 0.765 P <  .40
Region of Federal Regional 
Council 0.052 P <r .90
Median Income 0.721 P ^  .40
Unemployment Level 1.952 P <  .18
*Ten percent or more of the computed expected frequencies 
for each cell were less than five.
The Yates' correction method was employed to com­
pute the Chi-Square test of all the above correlations
when applicable.
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Table 3FF. Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating
of Local Official Respondents with Washington

















Total N=22 100.0% N=20 100.0%
Chi-square = 3.429 P < .02
Population also correlates with the effective­
ness and frequency of contact rating of a Washington
Federal office as determined by local officials. The 
response appears to indicate that the higher the popu­
lation of a city the greater the contact with a Federal 
agency in Washington. Table 3GG denotes that this corre­
lation is significant at the .05 level.
No other correlations proved to be meaningful at
the .05 level of significance or below; however, there
were three independent variables that appeared to illustrate 
a low significance rating. Partisan/nonpartisan elections, 
families with income below poverty level and median income 
level of a city's population all correlated at the .95 
level or higher with effectiveness and frequency of contact
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Table 3GG, Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating 
of Local Official Respondents with Washington 






Number Percent Number Percent
Low Rating 21 52.5 2 15.4
High Rating 19 47.5 11 84.6
Total N=30 100.0 N=13 100.0
Chi-square = 4.095 P <  .05
rating of a Washington Federal office by local leaders. 
Table 3HH has a complete diagram of all Washington Federal 
departments correlations.
There were four significant correlations at the 
.05 level or below for the effectiveness and frequency 
of contact rating with Councils of Government (C.O.G.) 
and independent variables. It appears by the responses 
of local officials that a partisan elected government has 
a high relationship with a low effectiveness and frequency 
of contact rating for Councils of Government (P«<.05), 
as is indicated by Table 311.
Ward selection as a method of city council selec­
tion also appears to correlate significantly with the 
effectiveness rating given C.O.G.s by city officials 
(P<'.025). Seemingly, ward selection of city council
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Table 3hli. Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact 
Rating of Local Official Respondents with 
Washington Federal Department/Agency by Inde­
pendent Variables
Independent Variable Chi-Square Level of Significance
Government Structure Variables
Merit System 0.022 P <  .90
Reform Score 1.o 45 P <  .70
*Form of Government 2.985 P <  .25
Grant Liaison Officer 5.429 P <  .02
Partisan/Nonpartisan 0.013 P <  .95
At Large-Ward Selection of City Council Members 2.621 P <  .12
Method of Selection of Mayor 0.038 P <  .90
Socioeconomic Variables
Population 4.095 P <  .05
Per Capita Income 0.562 P <  .45
Median Education 0.044 P <  .90
Families with Income Below 
Poverty Level 0.008 P <  .95
Region of Federal Regional 
Council 0.048 P < . 9 0
Median Income 0.000 P <1.00
Unemployment Level 0.445 P <  .60
*Ten percent or more of the computed expected frequencies 
for each cell were less than five.
The Yates' correction method was employed to com­
pute the Chi-square test of all the above correlations
when applicable.
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members parallels a low effectiveness rating for C.O.G.s, 
as is illustrated in Table 3JJ.
Table 3%I. Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating 
of Local Official Respondents with Council of
Governments by Partisan-Nonpartisan Government
Partisan-Nonpartisan Government
Partisan Nonpartisan
Number Percent Number Percent
Low Rating 9 90.0 21 48.8
High Rating 1 10.0 22 51.2
Total N=10 100.0 N=43 100.0
Chi-square = 4.046 P <  .05
Table 3JJ. Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating 
of Local Official Respondents with Council of 
Governments by Method of Selection of City 
Council Members
Method of Council Selection
At- large Ward
Numb er Percent Number Percent
Low Rating 18 46.2 12 85.7
High Rating 21 53.8 2 14.3
Total N=39 100.0 N=l4 100.0
Chi-square = 5-052 P < .025
Table 3KK indicates that the level of significance 
for the correlation of reform score and the effectiveness 
rating of Councils of Government is at the .05 level.
The sample taken of local officials illustrates that
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the higher the reform score the more likely a Council of 
Government will elicit a high effectiveness and frequency 
of contact rating.
Table 3KK. Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating 
of Local Official Respondents with Council of 
Governments by Reform Score
Reform Score
Low Medium High
No. Percent N o . Percent No . Percent
Low Rating 12 80.0 10 55.6 6 35.3
High Rating 3 20.0 8 44.4 11 64.7
Total N=15 100.0 N=l8 100.0 N=17 100.0
Chi-square = 6 .466 P <.05
As hypothesized the population variable shows a 
meaningful relationship (P<.05) with the effectiveness 
rating of Council of Governments by local leaders. Con­
versely to other correlations in this study by population, 
it appears that a low population correlates strongly with 
a low effectiveness rating of Council of Governments by 
city public officials, as is sho^vn in Table 3LL.
Median income, median education and unemployment 
level of a city in this study demonstrate a low signifi­
cance level of .95 or higher. Table 3MM lists all corre­
lations by independent variables.
In correlating independent variables with the 
effectiveness rating of the district Federal office one
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Table 3LL. Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating







Number Percent Number Percent
Low Rating 19 47.5 11 84.6
High Rating 21 52.5 2 15.4
Total N=4o 100.0 N=13 100.0
Chi-square = 4.095 P <.05
observes that there are no significant relationships at 
the .05 level. Three variables were clearly not signifi­
cant: merit system; selection of council members; and
median income, as is sho^m in Table 3NN.
Part V. An Analysis of the Positive Attitudes Held by
City Officials Toward Federal Regional Councils
The following is an assessment of the extent that 
city officials view Federal Regional Councils favorably. 
Twelve items comprise this section of the study.
Table 3-00 indicates that city officials responded 
in a mixed manner to the statement that Councils have 
expedited the grant process, although interestingly the 
largest reaction to this statement is the disagree answer, 
thirty-one officials indicating this response.
Apparently city officials do not feel that the 
Council in their region has attempted to keep the city
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Table 3MM. Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating
of Local Official Respondents with Council of
Government (C.O.G.) by Independent Variables
Independent Variable Chi-square Level of Significance
Government Structure Variables
Merit System 0.544 P < .50
Reform Score 6.466 P <  .05
*Form of Government 3.922 P <  .20
Grant Liaison Officer 0.901 P <  .35
Partisan/Nonpartisan 4.046 P <  .05
At Large-Ward Selection of 
City Council Members 5.052 P <  .025
Method of Selection of Mayor 0.038 P <  .90
Socioeconomic Variables
Population 4.095 P <  .05
Per Capita Income 0.007 P <  .95
Median Education 0.071 P <  .80
Families with Income Below 
Poverty Level 3.075 P <  .08
Region of Federal Regional 
Council 0.048 P <  .90
Median Income 0.000 P <1.00
Unemployment Level 0.002 P <1.00
*Ten percent or more of the computed expected frequencies 
for each cell were less than five.
The Yates' correction method was employed to com­
pute the Chi-square test of all the above correlations
when applicable.
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Table 3NN. Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating 
of Local Official Respondents with District/ 
Subdistrict Federal Office by Independent 
Variables
Independent Variable Chi-square Level of Significance
Government Structure Variables
Merit System 0.011 P < .95
Reform Score 2.912 P < .25
*Form of Government 0.981 P <  .70
Grant Liaison Officer 0.341 P < .60
Partisan/Nonpar tisan 0.048 P < .90
At Large-Ward Selection of 
City Council Members 0.000 P < 1.00
Method of Selection of Mayor 0.017 P <  . 90
Socioeconomi c Variables
Population 0.051 P <  .90
Per Capita Income 0.039 P <  .90
Median Education 0.026 P <  .90
Families with Income Below 
Poverty Level 0 .0.61 P <  .90
Region of Federal Regional 
Council 0.020 P <  .90
Median Income 0.000 P -<1.00
Unemployment Level 0.061 P -c .90
*Ten percent or more of the computed expected frequencies 
for each cell were less than five.
The Yates' correction method was employed to com­
pute the Chi-Square test of all the above correlations
when applicable.
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Table 3-00. Federal Regional Councils Have Expedited the 
Grant Process for This City
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
20.6% 45.6% 33.8% 100%
(14) (31) (23) (68)
informed about Council activities and programs that have a 
bearing on urban needs. Table 3PP illustrates that only 
eighteen officials agree that they have been kept informed 
by their Coiuicil.
Table 3PP. The Council Keeps This City Informed about
Its Activities and Programs Relating to Urban 
Needs
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
26.4% 54.5% 19.1% 100%
(18) (37) (13) (68)
Apparently city officials do not feel that Councils 
have reduced the number of steps necessary in obtaining a 
grant. Table 3QQ denotes that only seven city officials 
agree that Councils have reduced the steps necessary in 
obtaining a grant.
A substantial number of city officials appear 
uncertain whether Council members are more likely to respond 
with action to local needs and problems than are Washington 
bureaucrats. Table 3RR shows that twenty-seven city
Table 3QQ* Councils Have 
Necessary in
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Reduced the Number 
Obtaining a Grant
of Steps
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
10.3% 50.0% 39.7% 100%
(7) (34) (27) (68)
officials do not know if Council members are more likely 
to respond with action. However, more officials agreed 
with this statement than disagreed.
Table 3RR. Council Members Are More Likely To Respond
with Action to Local Needs and Problems than 
Are Bureaucrats in Washington
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
35.3% 25.0% 39.79% 100%
(24) (17) (27) (68)
Table 3SS indicates that a substantial number of 
city officials agree that Council members have a greater 
sensitivity and awareness to the needs of local governments 
than do Washington bureaucrats, although the largest 
response to this statement is the "don't know" category.
Table 3SS. Council Members Have a Greater Sensitivity 
and Awareness to the Needs of Local Govern­
ments than Do Washington Bureaucrats
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
36.8% 25.0% 38.2% 100%
(25) (17) (26) (68)
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Table 3TT shows that almost half of the city offi­
cials specified the "don't know" response in relation to 
the statement that Council members have coordinated Federal 
grant information from their respective agencies for their 
particular city when such an inquiry was made. One could 
conjecture that the reason the "don't know" response is so 
frequent is that many officials have simply not made an 
information inquiry to their regional Council. More offi­
cials disagreed with this response than agreed.
Table 3TT. Council Members Have Coordinated Federal 
Grant Information for My City Ifhen Asked
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
23 . 5% 30.9% 45.6% 100%
(16) (21) (31) (68)
Only sixteen officials agree that members of the 
Federal Regional Council have coordinated the resources 
of their respective agencies in relation to solving grant 
problems for their city, as is shown in Table 3UU.
Table 3UU. Members of the Council Have Coordinated the 
Resources of Their Respective Agencies in 
Solving the City's Grant Problems
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
23.5% 45.6% 30.9% 100%
(16) (31) (21) (68)
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City officials overwhelmingly disagree that 
Councils have reduced the number of contacts their city 
makes with other sources, i.e., Congressmen and Senators, 
direct to Washington, C.O.G.s, and district Federal 
offices. Table 3 W  denotes that only five officials 
agreed with this statement.
Table 3VV. Councils Have Reduced the Number of Contacts 
Your City Makes with Other Grant Sources
Agree Disagree Don't Know To t al
7. Wo 73.5% 19.1% 100%
(5) (50) (13) (68)
Perhaps one of the reasons that city officials 
have manifested a hesitance to contact Councils is that 
they view Council members as lacking sufficient authority 
to make decisions and that these members must fre­
quently clear problems encountered on the Council with 
their department chiefs in Washington. Table 3Wlf indicates 
that thirty-eight officials agree that Council members 
are lacking in sufficient authority.
Table 3VW. Members of the Council Lack Sufficient
Authority To Make Decisions and Must Clear 
Problems with Washington
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
55.9% 8.9% 35.2% 100%
(38) (6) (24) (68)
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Table 3XX illustrates that there appears to be 
substantial disagreement concerning whether the Councils 
have been beneficial to one's city. Interestingly the 
largest response to this item is "disagree," indicated by 
twenty-five officials.
Table 3XX. Contacts with the Federal Regional Council 
Have Been Beneficial to My City
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
35.3# 36.8% 27.9% 100%
(24) (25) (19) (68)
City officials obviously disagree that Councils 
are merely another bureaucratic obstacle one faces when 
he seeks to obtain a Federal grant. Table 3YÏ indicates 
that only sixteen officials agreed with this statement; 
however, a substantial number of officials designated 
"don't know."
Table 3YY. Best Description of Federal Regional Councils;
Merely Another Bureaucratic Obstacle in the 
Process of Obtaining a Federal Grant
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
23 . 5% 41.2% 35.3% 100%
(16) (28) (24) (68)
Table 3ZZ denotes that the jury appears still to 
be out concerning the question of the continuation of the
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Councils as a permanent part of the Federal structure. A 
surprisingly high thirty-three city officials indicate 
they do not know. Of interest, certainly, is the quite 
low number of officials who indicate they disagree that 
the Council should continue.
Table 3ZZ. I believe Councils Should Continue as a 
Permanent Part of the Federal Structure
Agree Disagree Don’t Know Total
38.3% 13 .2% 48.5% 100%
(26) (9) (33) (68)
In correlating the independent variables to posi­
tive attitudes of local officials with Federal Regional 
Councils, no correlations were found to be significant at 
the .05 level or below. Moreover, many of the relation­
ships appeared to illustrate an extreme lack of correla­
tion, e.g. reform score (P <.99)> at-large/ward selection 
of city council members (P*Cl.OO). For greater detail in 
regard to positive attitudes of Councils by local official 
respondents and correlation with independent variables, 
see Table 3AAA.
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Table 3AAA. Positive Attitudes of Local Official Respon­
dents with Federal Regional Council by Inde­
pendent Variables
Independent Variable Chi-Square Level of Significance
Government Structure Variables
Merit System 0.041 P ^:.90
Reform Score 0.400 P <  .99
*Form of Government 1.712 P ^ . 5 0
Grant Liaison Officer 0.900 P <  .35
Partisan/Nonpartisan 0.184 P <  .70
At Large-Ward Selection of 
City Council Members 0.000 P <  1.00
Method of Selection of Mayor 0.023 P <  .90
Socioeconomic Variables
Population 0.689 P ^  .45
Per Capita Income 0.096 P <  .80
Median Education
Families with Income Below 
Poverty Level 0.258 P .70
Region of Federal Regional 
Council 0.057 P <  .90
Median Income 0.020 P <c-90
Unemployment Level 0.330 P <  .60
*Ten percent or more of the computed expected frequencies 
for each cell were less than five.
The Yates' Correction Method was employed to com­
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II. Frequency of contact 
with Councils vis-a-vis 
other sources
A. Councils 2.409P<.l4 4.697Pc.o4 0.790PC. 40 4.305Pc. 04 4.892Pc. 04 0.059Pc. 90 1.450 Pc. 25











III. Rating of Councils vis- 
a-vis other sources on 
effectiveness and fre­
quency of contact




PC. 60 0.189Pc. 70 1.013 Pc.35
0.166
PC.70 0.833Pc. 40







Pc. 90 0.765Pc. 40 1.952Pc. 18 0.052Pc. 90
C. Direct to 
Washington 4.095PC. 05
0.0








0. Council of Govern­
ment 4.095P<.05
0.0
P<1.00 0.007 Pc. 95
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IV. Positive attitudes 
toward Councils held by 












ATTITUDES OF FEDERAL REGIONAL COUNCIL MEMBERS
This chapter presents an analysis of the opinions 
of a sample of Council members in Federal regions IX, VI, 
and II. These opinions are divided into three principal 
areas: Council service to cities within their Federal 
region; lack of decentralization of member Council agencies 
to the regional level; and the question of the need for 
increased Council coordination and authority.
Part I. Council Service to Cities
Part I is an analysis of Council members' percep­
tion of the nature of service the Council provides to cities 
in their respective Federal Region.
Apparently most Council members do not perceive 
their organization as having working contacts with city 
managers within their Federal region. Table kA illustrates 
that only three of the thirteen members participating in 
the study agree that the Council has working relations with 
city managers.
Table 4b indicates that even though members do not 
perceive the Council as having working contacts with city
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Have Working Contacts with
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
23.1% 46.2% 30.7% 100%
(3) (6) (4) (13)
managers, the members are, nevertheless, of the opinion 
that the Council does make an effort to keep city managers 
within their region familiar with Council programs that 
relate to urban needs. Ten members agree that such an 
effort is made. The response to this item was found to be 
statistically significant at the .025 level (Table 4C).
Table 4B. The Council Makes an Effort To Keep City 
Managers Familiar with Council Programs
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
77.0% 15.4% 7.6% 100%
(10) (2) (1) (13)
Tel bio 4C. The Council Makes an Effort To 








Chi-square = 5.333 P<.025
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Table 40 shows that there appears to be some disa­
greement concerning whether Councils have sponsored meetings 
for city officials. Eight members, of thirteen, stated 
that such meetings were held. This factual discrepancy 
could perhaps be explained in part by the fact that mem­
bers from three different Councils participated in the 
study.
Table 4D. The Council Has Sponsored Meetings for City 
Officials within This Region
Agree Disagree Total
6l. 5% 38.5% 100%
(8) (5) (13)
There appears to be quite strong agreement that 
the Council system allows Federal officials in the region 
a closer working arrangement with city officials than 
these local officials had with Washington bureaucrats 
prior to the formulation of the Council. Table 4E points 
out that eight members agree that a closer working arrange­
ment has been achieved by the Council system. The response 
to this item is significant at the .005 level (Table 4F).
Table 4G indicates that Council members overwhelmingly 
agree that they have a greater sensitivity to the needs of 
local governments in their region than do Washington bureau­
crats. The response to this item is significant at the 
.005 level (Table 4H).
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Table 4E. The Council System Allows Federal Officials a 
Closer Working Arrangement with City Officials 
than Existed Previously
Agree Disagree Don * t Know Total
6l. 6% 0 38.4% 100%
(8) (0) (5) (13)
Table 4F. The Council System Allows Federal Officials a 
Closer Working Arrangement with City Offi­






Chi- square = 8.0 P < .005
Table 4g . Council Members Have a Greater 




Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
76.9% 0 23.1% 100%
(10) (0) (3) (13)
Council members do not perceive the Council as 
becoming institutionalized and accepted by local officials 
as the place where decisions on program approval and 
implementation are made. Table 4l shows that only three
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Table 4H. Council Members Have a Greater Sensitivity to 
the Needs of Local Governments than Do Wash­






Chi-square = 10.0 P <.005
members agree that Councils are becoming more accepted as 
such a mechanism.
Table 4l. The Council Is Becoming Accepted by Local 
Officials as the Place Where Substantive 
Decisions Are Made
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
23.1% 46.2% 30.7% 100%
C3) (6) (4) (13)
Table 4J illustrates that a majority of Council 
members consider that Councils are of little assistance to 
cities in the grant process except when a grant in question 
relates to several different agencies on the Council.
There appears to be significant agreement on the 
point that a city official is better served by contacting 
the related district Federal office rather than the Council 
when he has a question concerning a grant that is handled 
by a specific Federal agency. Table 4K points out that
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Table 4J . Councils Are Helpful to Cities Only \fhen a
Grant in Question Relates to Several Agencies
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
53.8# 23.1% 23.1% 100%
(7) (3) (3) (13)
the district Federal office would be the best contact in 
such a case, none disagreed. Two did not know. This response 
is statistically significant at the .001 level (Table 4L).
Table 4K. When a City Official Has a Question Concerning
a Grant Handled by a Specific Agency, He Is
Better Served by the District Federal Office
Rather Than the Council
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
84.6% 0 15.4% 100%
(11) (0) (2) (13)
Table 4L. When a City Official Has a Question Concerning
a Grant Handled by a Specific Agency, He Is 
Better Served by the District Federal Office 






Chi-square = 11.0 P<.001
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There appears to be an agreement by Council mem­
bers that Councils do expedite the grant process when the 
grant in question relates to several different agencies 
on the Council. Table 4M indicates that nine members are 
of the opinion that Councils do expedite the grant process 
in such a case. A statistical significance level of .05 
is recorded for this response (Table 4N).
Table 4M. Councils‘Expedite the Grant Process When the
Grant Relates to Several Agencies on the Council
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
69.2# 15.4% 15.4% 100%
(9) (2) (2) (13)
Table 4N. Councils Expedite the Grant Process Ifhen the
Grant Relates to Several Agencies on the Council 





Chi-square = 4.455 P < . 0 5
Table 4-0 appears to indicate that apparently there 
is significant disagreement and uncertainty on the point 
whether the Council system has been very successful in 
achieving its stated purpose of program coordination. Only
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four members agree that the Council system has achieved 
coordination.
Table 4-0. The Council Has Been Very Successful in 
Achieving Program Coordination
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
30.8# 30.8# 38.4# 100#
(4) (4) (3) (13)
There appears to be disagreement concerning whether 
the Council is consulted on a regular basis by city offi­
cials seeking general information about Federal grants. 
Table 4P points out that only seven officials agree with 
this observation.
Table 4P. Perception Concerning Contact; The Council Is 
Consulted on a Regular Basis by City Officials 
Seeking General Information about Federal Grants
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
53.9# 38.5# 7 . 6# 100#
(7) (5) (1) (13)
Table 4q indicates that there also appears to be 
substantial disagreement concerning whether the Council is 
contacted frequently by city officials seeking specialized 
assistance with grant problems.
In the Southwest Council there is an effort for 
the Council Secretariar to meet with local officials in a 
consistent manner. Currently meetings are held with local
139
Table 4Q. Perception Concerning Contact: The Council Is
Consulted Frequently by City Officials Seeking
Specialized Assistance with Grant Problems
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
56.2% 30.8% 23.0% 100%
(6) (4) (3) (13)
officials on a quarterly basis. At these meetings an
attempt is made to meet with state, county, and municipal
officials in each of the Region VI states. At one time
the Council decided for the Secretariat to meet regularly
as a group in each of the region states in order to allow
state and local officials in those states a working knowledge
of the Council. However, only one such meeting was held.
it was decided that the constraints of the energy crisis
130made such trips impractical. Region IX sponsors quarterly
meetings in the states. Special sessions are held with
governors, state agency heads, city and county officials,
131public interest groups, etc. In Region VI an Activity
130Harvey Bradshaw, Special Assistant to the 
Director of the Federal Regional Council, private inter­
view held at the Federal Regional Council Office in Dallas, 
Texas, March, 197^.
131 Gale Held, Special Assistant for the Director 
of Health, Education and Welfare, private interview held 
at the Federal Regional Council in San Francisco, Calif., 
January, 1974.
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Table 4R. Council Members' Attitude Toward Council Service 
to Cities: Levels of Statistical Significance
Attitudes Chi-square Level of Significance
City Managers Have Working Con­
tacts with the Council 1.0 P ^.50
Council Makes Effort To Keep 
City Informed on Its Activities 5.333 P< .025
Council Has Sponsored Meetings .692 P ^.50
Council Allows Federal Offi­
cials a Closer Working Arrange­
ment with City Officials 8.0 P ̂  .005
Council Members Have Greater 
Sensitivity to Local Needs than 
Washington Officials 10.0 P ̂  .005
Council Is Becoming Accepted as 
Decision Making Body 1.0 P c . 50
Council Is Helpful to Cities 
Only When a Grant in Question 
Relates to Several Agencies 1.60 P <  .25
When the City Official Has a 
Question Relating to a Specific 
Agency He Is Better Served by 
the District Federal Office 11.0 P < .001
Councils Expedite the Grant 
Process When the Grant Relates 
to Several Agencies on the 
Council 4.455 P <  .05
Councils Are Helpful in Pro­
gram Coordination 0.0 P ^.995
Council Is Consulted Regularly 
by City Officials Seeking Gen­
eral Information about Grants .333 P C .70
Council Is Consulted Regularly 
by City Officials Seeking Assis­
tance with Grant Problems .40 P <.70
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Plan is sent yearly to state and local officials describing
132the objectives and activities of the Council.
There is some controversy within the Councils 
concerning whether Councils should serve larger or smaller 
governments within their respective region. One member of 
the Region IX Secretariat reasoned that the larger cities 
already have access to expertise in grnatsmanship, that is, 
many have a grant liaison officer on their staff. On the 
other hand smaller governments need assistance quite badly.
Realizing this, the Region XX Council actively attempts’ to
133assist Indian Tribes within its jurisdiction.
Part II. The Lack of Decentralization of Member Agencies 
This section concerns an analysis of Council mem­
bers ' attitudes toward the problem os decentralization of 
member agencies and departments on the Council. Several
writers, for example Mogulof,^^^ Kolberg,^^^ Clark^^^ and 
137Malek, state that the lack of decentralization of
132Bradshaw, op. cit.
133Bill Stone, Staff Assistant to the Regional 
Representative of the Secretary of Transportation, private
interview held at the Federal Regional Council in San
Francisco, Calif., January, 1974.
^^^Mogulof, op. cit., p. 238.
^^^Kolberg, op. cit. , p. 53.
^^^Clark, op. cit. , p. 58O.
^^^Malek, op. cit. , p. 18.
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of member agencies is one of the chief problems faced by 
the Council.
Table 4S points out that Council members are of the 
opinion that the lack of decentralization of member agencies 
and departments on the Council is indeed an inhibiting 
factor for the Federal Regional Councils. Ten members agree 
that the lack of decentralization is a significant problem 
on the Council. This response is statistically significant 
at the .01 level (Table 4T) .
Table 4S. Perception of the Problem of Decentralization 
of Member Departments and Agencies; Is the 
Lack of Decentralization a Principal Problem?
. Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
77% 7.7% 15.3% 100#
(10) (1) (2) (13)
Table 4t. Perception of the Problem of Decentralization 
of Member Departments and Agencies: Is the 
Lack of Decentralization a Principal Problem: 
Level of Statistical Significance
Observed Expected
Agree 10 5.5
Disagree . 1 5.5
Total 11 11
Chi-square = 7.364 P<.01
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Table 4U illustrates that the Council members agree 
almost unanimously that if the same amount of line authority 
were granted to each of the nine Federal Regional Council 
members within their respective agencies, the Council would 
be able to perform its functions more effectively than at 
present. Twelve members agree that such an arrangement 
would facilitate the Council's performance. A statistical 
significance level of .005 is recorded for this response 
(Table 4V).
Table 4U. If Equal Line Authority Were Granted to Each
Member , the Council Would Benefit
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
92.3% 7*7% 0 100%
(12) (1) (0) (13)
Table 4V. If Equal Line Authority Were Granted to Each 






Chi-square = 9*307 P .005 
Most Council members are of the opinion that those 
members who have more line authority over their agency
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usually play a more effective role on the Council than 
those members who have less line authority, as is indi­
cated in Table 4W. Nine members agree that members having 
more line authority play a more effective role in the 
Council than those members who have less line authority. 
This response is statistically significant at the .05 level 
(Table 4X).
Table 4W. Members Who Have More Line Authority Play a 
More Effective Role on the Council
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
69.2# 15.4# 15.4% 100%
(9) (2) (2) (13)
Table 4X. Members Who Have More 
Effective Role on the 
tistical Significance
Line Authority Play a More 





Chi-square = 4 . 4 5 5  P .05
Table 4Y specifies that Council members appear to 
be in substantial disagreement concerning individual members 
of the Council finding it necessary to frequently clear up 
Council problems by passing them to their Washington
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headquarters. Six members disagree that this is the 
case .
Table 4Y. Council Members Must Frequently Pass Problems 
to Washington for Solving
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
30.8% 46.2% 23.0% 100%
(4) (6) (3) (13)
Wlien the Council member lacks line authority over
agencies or programs within his department, the member
138must "handle the agency diplomatically" or attempt to
139"get things done through power plays." Some Council
members think this arrangement seriously curtails the 
effectiveness of the Council. One here is reminded of 
Mogulof's contention that with an absence of authority 
a natural bargaining situation will be established, i.e.,
Agency 'A' will accommodate its behavior to Agency 'B*
140if the former receives something from the latter.
In some cases Council members find it frustrating 
attempting to coordinate subordinate departmental agencies
•1 o  Q Bob Mace, Special Assistant to the Regional 
Forester, private interview held at the Federal Regional 
Council Office in San Francisco, Calif., January, 1974.
j 39Gale Held, Special Assistant for the Director 
of Health Education and Welfare, private interview held 
at the Federal Regional Council Office in San Francisco, 
Calif., January, 1974.
^^^Mogulof, op. cit., p. 236.
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and programs when they have little, or no, interest in
coordination or compromise. In one particular case a newly
appointed Council member in Region IX thought he had, and
acted as if he had, line authority over his agency when
indeed he had virtually none. He ended up "offending a
lot of people and consequently didn't last long on the 
14JCouncil."^ ^
On the other hand there is a contention that the
lack of line authority of Council members over their o\fn
departmental agencies does not hinder their effectiveness
in the least but, conversely, enhances the member's position
within his own agency.
If they j^ouncil niember^Y are effective people then 
the lack of line authority does not matter. In 
fact an increase in line authority can block com­
munication , that is, there can't be a free inter­
change. The emphasis should be on personality not
formal a u t h o r i t y .
One Council staff member stated that in order for 
the Council to serve its purpose a stronger organizational 
devision making system would be absolutely mandatory. She 
thought the answer to this problem essentially was to grant 
all Council administrators complete line authority over
l4lHaldy Pierce, Staff Assistant for Environmental 
Review, private interview held at the Federal Regional 
Council Office in San Francisco, Calif., January, 1974.
1 42Arthur Busch, Regional Director of Environmen­
tal Protection Agency, Chairman of the Southwest Federal 
Revional Council; Private interview held at the Federal 
Regional Council Office in Dallas, Texas, March, 19?4.
14?
their ô vn agencies. This "begging” to coordinate must be
 ̂ 143 stopped.
Table 4Z. Council Members' Attitudes Toward Problem of 
Decentralization: Levels of Statistical Sig­
nificance
Attitudes Chi-square Level, of Significance
Is Lack of Member Agencies' 
Decentralization a Principal 
Problem 7.364 P <. 01
If Equal Line Authority Were 
Granted, the Council Would 
Benefit 9.307 P <.005
Members Who Have More Line 
Authority Play a More Effec­
tive Role 4.455 P <.05
Council Members Must Pass 
Problems to Washington .4 P <.70
Part III. Council Coordination and Authority
This section concerns an analysis of the attitudes 
of the Council members and staff toward the need for 
increased coordination and authority within the Council 
mechanism. The following is a list of various items that 
elicited opinions from Council members on the subject of 
Council coordination and authority.
A preponderance of members express agreement that 
the Council has experienced some disagreement among its
143Held, op. cit
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members because of functional agency pressures to avoid 
compromising agency interests. Six members are in agree­
ment as is specified in Table 4AA.
Table 4aA. The Council Has Experienced Some Disagreement 
Because of Agency Pressures To Avoid Compro­
mise
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
46.2% 23.1% 30.7% 100%
(6) (3) (4) (13)
Table 4BB denotes that a clear majority of the
Council members disagree that issues which have a high
potential for controversy are at times avoided by the
Federal Regional Council, Seven members disagree that
controversial issues are avoided by the Council.
Table 4BB. Issues with High Potential for Controversy Are 
Avoided by the Council
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
15.4% 53.9% 30.7% 100%
(2) (7) (4) (13)
Table 4CC indicates that a preponderance of Council 
members are of the opinion that since the Council operates 
by consensus, this usually prevents Council members from 
taking effective action, as an organization, on issues 
which t\iere is considerable conflict among the Council
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members. Nine members agree that the operation by consen­
sus inhibits Council action.
Table 4CC. The Operation by Consensus Prevents the Coun­
cil from Taking Action on Controversial Issues
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
69.3% 30.7% 0 100%
(9) (4) (0) (13)
There is apparently quite strong agreement that 
in order for the Federal Regional Councils to perform 
adequately there must be a stronger coordination mechanism 
within the Council than now exists as is designated in 
Table 4DD. Ten Council members agree that a stronger 
coordination mechanism is needed. A statistical signifi­
cance level of .025 is recorded for this response (Table 4EE)
Table 4DD. A Stronger Coordination Mechanism Is Needed 
Within the Council
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
77.0% 15.4% 7 .6% 100%
(10) (2) (1) (13)
While it appears that Council members are of the 
opinion that there is a need for a stronger coordination 
mechanism within the Council, obviously most members do 
not feel that the Office of Management and Budget is the 
desirable agency to provide the needed coordination.
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Table 4EE. A Stronger Coordination Mechanism Is Needed






Chi-square = 5.333 P <.025
Table 4FF specifies that only two Council members agree 
that the Office of Management and Budget's role within the 
Council should be increased so that this agency can act as 
a coordinating influence with power of enforcement. A 
statistical significance level of .025 is recorded for this 
response (Table 4GG).
Table 4FF. The 0.M.S.'s Role Should Be Increased So It Can 
Have Power of Enforcement
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
15.4% 76.9% 7 .7% 100%
(2) (10) (1) (13)
Council members express considerable disagreement 
concerning whether there is a need for a full time Office 
of Management and Budget representative on the Council. A 
substantial number, however, denote they do not believe a
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Table 4g G. The O.M.B.’s Role Should Be Increased So It






Chi-square = 5-333 P<.025
full time Office of Management and Budget representative 
member should be assigned to the Council, as is specified 
in Table 4HH.
Table 4HH. The Council Would Operate More Effectively if 
O.M.B. Would Assign a Full Time Permanent 
Representative Here
Agree Disagree Don•t Know Total
23 .1% 61.5% 15.4% 100%
(3) (8 ) (2) (13)
Table 4ll indicates that most members do not feel 
that the Council chairman should be given line authority 
over other Council members. Only two members agree that 
the chairman should be given line authority. This response 
is statistically significant at the .05 level (Table 4jJ).
It seems as if there is somewhat of a differing of 
opinion concerning whether or not a Council Chairman should
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Table 4ll. The Council Chairman Should Be Given Line 
Authority over the Other Council Members
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
15.4% 69.2% 15.4% 100%
(2) (9) (2) (13)
Table 4JJ. The Council Chairman Should Be Given Line 
Authority over the Other Council Members; 





Chi-square = 4.455 P < . 0 5
not have to also serve as his agency regional head because 
of this dual assignment dividing his time too much between 
agency and Council duties. Table 4KK indicates, however, 
that a majority of members disagree with this position.
Table 4KK, The Chairman Should Not Have To Serve a Dual
Assignment as Agency Head as This Curtails His 
Effectiveness on the Council
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
30.8% 53.9% 15.3% 100%
(4) (7) (2) (13)
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The Office of Management and Budget's evaluation 
of the Councils contended that the Under Secretaries 
Group could be characterized by permissive management. 
There appears to be substantial disagreement and uncer­
tainty concerning this evaluation, as is denoted in Table 
4LL.
Table 4LL. The Under Secretaries Group Can Be Character­
ized by Permissive Management
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
38.5% 23.0% 38.9% 100%
(5) (3) (5) (13)
The Office of Management and Budget's assessment 
of Council observed that Councils generally make a con­
certed effort on projects when the Under Secretaries 
Group provides management direction and guidance. A majority 
of the Council members agree with this assessment, as is 
designated in Table 4MM.
Table 4MM. The Council Operates Best When the Under
Secretaries Group Provides Clear Management 
Direction and Assistance
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
53.8% 15.4% 30.8% 100%
(7) (2) (4) (13)
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The Office of Management and Budget's study of 
the Council system asserted that one impediment to effec­
tive Council operation was the lack of formalized 
standards for planning work and reporting progress. 
Apparently Council members don't agree with this assess­
ment, although it does seem as if there is a significant 
amount of uncertainty about this matter, as is reflected 
in Table 4NN.
Table 4NN. Absence of Formalized Standards for Planning 
Work and Reporting Curtails Effectiveness of 
the Council
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
7.6% 46.2% 46.2% 100%
(1) (6) (6 )' (13)
Table 4-00 indicates that there appears to be a 
significant differing of opinion concerning having observed 
fellow Council members experiencing conflict as a result 
of cross pressures from one's agency vis-à-vis the Council.
Table 4-00. Council Members Have Experienced Conflict as 
a Result of Functional Expectations of One's 
Agency Contradicting the Area Coordination 
Expectations of the Council
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
46.1% 53.9% 0 100%
(6 ) (7) (0 ) (13)
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A clear majority of the Council members appear to 
believe that when a member is torn between the expecta­
tions of his agency and the Council he decides in favor 
of the agency vis-à-vis the Federal Regional Council.
Table 4PP specifies that eight members agree with this 
position. A significance level of .02 is recorded for this 
response (Table 4QQ).
Table 4PP. When a Council Member Is Torn Between Expec­
tations of His Agency and the Council, He 
Decides in Favor of the Agency
Agree Disagree Don't Know Total
6l . 6% 7.6% 30.8% 100%
(8) (1) (4) (13)
Table 4q Q. When a Council Member Is Torn 
tations of His Agency and the 









Chi-square = 5.444 P <  .02
The Councils operate from a standpoint of con­
sensus. As a general rule there is not a great deal of 
disagreement or conflict on the Council. In cases where
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one agency has strong feelings about an issue before the 
Council, the other member agencies "tend to go along 
silently." There are obvious pay-offs; that is, it is 
understood when an agency makes a compromise the other 
agencies are expected to make similar compromises later
At times there is a feeling that bitter inters 
agency conflict is inevitable; however, it rarely turns 
out to be as heated as was expected. An example of this 
in region IX was the potential for conflict between the 
Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of 
Transportation in setting standards for mass transit in 
the Los Angelos basin. The issue of a timetable for com­
pletion of a Department of Transportation program was a 
much debated issue but ultimately did not present an
insurmountable problem for the members representing the
1^5respective related agencies on the Council.
One staff member of region VI characterized the 
Council members as lacking candor in many instances, that 
is, the members don't "speak their minds" but "try to get 
along" oi* at least "give the impression of getting along." 
A concentrated effort is made to "not offend anyone." As
l̂ t4Stone, op. cit. 
l^^Ibid.
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a result of this phenomenon, Council members don't challenge
each other's position for fear of conflict. On the other
hand the Secretariat members are not this way but tend
to "bite the bullet" and "tell it like it is." The
Secretariat members do not fear conflict as do the members.
They see conflict as inevitable if anything is to be
1^6accomplished by the Council.
XklDean has maintained that the role of the chairman 
is crucial to the operation of the Council, and that perhaps 
some modification in the present situation of frequent turn­
over of the chairman should be made. A Secretariat member 
stated that by assuming dual roles as chairman as well as 
agency representative, the Council chairmanship is weakened. 
For example, if the Council chairman's home agency opposes 
a Council activity, then the chairman will oppose this
activity forthwith and the Council's effort is consequently
1 1,  ̂ 148 squelched.
One Council member stated that the Council suffers 
because of the vicissitudes of the chairmanship. At 
times of a strong chairman, the Council gets a lot done.
\fhen this is not the case "the Council does not accomplish 
much." Under one past chairman some members stopped going
l46 Bradshaw, op. cit.
l4?Dean, op. cit., p. 12
l^^Ibid.
158
to Council meetings entirely because they knew nothing
1^9would be accomplished anyway.
The issue concerning the need for a more meaning­
ful coordination mechanism within the Council brings mixed 
responses from Council members and staff. A Council chair­
man stated that if the Chairman is given line authority 
over the other Council members, then one will have merely 
another layer of bureaucracy. This was, he stated, "not 
the intent of the Council arrangement. One member 
expressed doubts that the Office of Management and Budget 
would be a feasible agency to provide coordination on 
the Council. The Office of Management and Budget, she
stated, merely duplicated the work already effectively
151completed by other agencies.
/\n interesting observation was made by the staff 
director of Region VX concerning the Councils. He 
stated that one must not anticipate unrealistic expedi­
tious progress to be made by the Councils. He referred 
to the racial integration issue as being, analogous to 
the Council situation in that the complexities involved
1^9Richard Morgan, Regional Administrator, Depart­
ment of Housing and Urban Development, private interview 





in both situations demand that one be relatively patient 
and appreciate incremental progress when it is realized. 
This outlook prevents one from throwing up his hands in 
despair saying nothing is being accomplished, when in 
actuality some very meaningful changes are being made. 
"Concessions are being made that can lead to further 
progress." If one wanted to find the evidence he could 
contend that as of today Councils have accomplished 
virtually nothing of significance, and consequently 
serve no purpose in our Federal system. On the other 
hand, a structure has been implemented where representa­
tives of different Federal agencies can sit down and 
talk with each other and begin to see each other's 
problems and for the first time really understand what the 
other agencies are all about. "So a stage has been set up 
for further intergovernmental cooperation, and viewed in 
this manner the Council arrangement does definitely repre-
152sent progress in the intergovernmental area."
^ Charles Woods, Staff Director for Region VI 
Federal Regional Council, private interview held at the 
Federal Regional Council Office in Dallas, Texas, March,
1974.
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Table 4RR. Members' Attitudes Concerning Council
Coordination and Authority: Levels of Sta­
tistical Significance
Attitudes Chi-square Level of Significance
Council Has Experienced Disagree­
ment Because of Agency Pressures 1.0 P <.50
Controversial Issues Are Avoided 2.778 P <.10
Consensus Prevents Council 
Action on Controversial Issues 1.923 P <.10
A Stronger Council Coordination 
Mechanism Is Needed 5.333 P<.025
The 0.M.S.'s Council Role Should 
Be Increased 5.333 P <  .025
Council Chairman Should Be Given 
Line Authority 4.555 P < . 0 5
Chairman Should Not Have Dual 
Roles .818 P < . 5 0
Under Secretaries Group Can Be 
Characterized by Permissive 
Management .5 P <  .50
Councils Operate Best When Under 
Secretaries Group Provides Clear 
Management 2.778 P < . 1 0
If O.M.B. Would Assign a Full 
Time Representative Here, the 
Council Would Benefit 2.273 P <. 10
Absence of Formalized Standards 
Curtails Council Effectiveness 3.571 P <  .10
Members Have Experienced Con­
flict over Agency vis-a-vis 
Council Expectations .077 P <  .98
When a Member Is Torn Between 
His Agency and the Council, He 
Decides in Favor of the Agency 5.444 P <  .02
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
This research has examined various facets of city 
officials' attitudes toward Federal Regional Councils as 
well as Council members' attitudes toward Councils.
The research first emphasized city officials' 
attitudes on these general areas; officials' acquaintance 
with Councils, the frequency with which city officials 
contact Federal Regional Councils vis-à-vis other sources 
of grant information and/or assistance (the other sources 
selected for purposes of the research were: Congressmen
and Senators, direct to Washington communication, C.O.G.s, 
and district Federal offices); officials' rating of Coun­
cils, and each of the other selected grant access sources, 
on the combined criteria of frequency of contact and 
effectiveness of contact; and, lastly, the extent city 
officials hold positive attitudes toward the Federal 
Regional Council arrangement.
Concerning the extent city officials are acquainted 
with their respective Federal Regional Councils, this 
study found substantive alleged acquaintance. A majority 
of city officials claimed to have had personal contact
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with their Council, to have attended at least one meeting 
sponsored by the Council, and, overwhelmingly, professed 
to be familiar with the functions and activities of their 
Council.
In appraising the overall frequency of contact 
with which Federal Regional Councils are consulted vis-à- 
vis other sources of grant information and/or assistance, 
Councils placed last, behind all the four other alterna­
tive sources, listed in order of preference by city offi­
cials: district federal offices, direct communication
with a Washington agency, U.S. Congressmen or Senators, 
C.O.G.s, and Councils.
In rating Councils vis-à-vis other sources con­
cerning the frequency consulted for seeking information 
about grants. Councils placed fourth behind these sources 
(listed in order of preference): direct communication
with Washington, Federal district offices, and C.O.Gvs. 
Councils outranked only Congressmen and Senators in this 
category.
Concerning the frequency with which local offi­
cials seek assistance with a grant problem Councils again 
placed fourth behind these sources (ranked in order of 
preference): the district federal offices, direct com­
munication to a Washington agency, and Congressmen and 
Senators. Councils placed above only C.O.G.s in this 
area.
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The following responses were obtained in evaluating 
how Councils ranked vis-à-vis other sources concerning 
effectiveness of contact rating in gaining general infor­
mation about available grants. Councils placed last behind 
these ranked agencies; ‘ direct communication with a 
Washington agency, Federal district office, C.O.G.s, and 
Congressmen and Senators.
In appraising how Councils rank as opposed to 
other sources concerning effectiveness of contact ratings 
relating to grant problem solving. Councils placed fourth, 
only above C.O.G.s, and behind (in order of preference) 
Federal district offices, direct communication to a 
Washington agency, and Congressmen and Senators.
From the foregoing analysis one sees that the 
least effective rating the Council received was in the 
area of officials gaining general information about 
available grants. In the other ratings the Councils 
were at least preferable to one of the four other agen­
cies. Councils outranked C.O.G.s both in frequency of 
contact in seeking assistance with a grant problem and 
in effectiveness of contact rating in solving a problem, 
and of course. Councils outranked Congressmen and Senators 
in the frequency of contact made in seeking general 
information about grants.
In analyzing the extent city officials hold posi­
tive attitudes towards Federal Regional Councils, these
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results were obtained; city officials do not believe 
Councils have expedited the grant process for their city, 
officials do not think their Council keeps them informed 
about its activities and programs, they do not believe 
their Council has reduced the number of steps necessary 
in obtaining a grant, they do not think their Council has 
reduced the number of contacts their city makes with 
other grant sources ; city officials disagree that Coun­
cil members have either coordinated grant information for 
their city, or coordinated the resources of the respective 
Council agencies in solving the city's grant problems.
Howevei', city officials do perceive the Councils 
as more likely to respond with action to local needs and 
problems than are Washington bureaucrats, and that Council 
members have a greater sensitivity and awareness to the 
needs of local government than do Washington bureaucrats.
City officials express uncertainty and substantial 
disagreement with each other concerning whether Councils 
have been beneficial to their city. Officials disagree 
that Councils are merely another bureaucratic layer and, 
perhaps most importantly, agree that Councils should be 
maintained as a permanent part of the Federal structure.
This research operated on the basis of two principal 
sets of hypotheses: hypotheses relating to city officials'
attitudes toward the performance of the Federal Regional 
Council in their respective region, and hypotheses relating
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to Council members' attitudes toward the performance of 
Federal Regional Councils.
Each of the hypotheses making up these two sets 
listed in Chapter II are examined in order to ascertain 
if the hypothesis in question is confirmed, or conversely, 
if its null hypothesis is accepted.
The relationship between urban government reform 
institutions and the extent of acquaintance cities have 
with Federal Regional Councils was explored. The null 
hypothesis was accepted for the following reform institu­
tions as they relate to extent of acquaintance with 
Federal Regional Councils; nonpartisan government; per­
cent of city employees on a merit system; city manager 
form of government, at-large selection of Council mem­
bers, method used in selection of mayor, and city reform 
score. The hypothesis was confirmed for the possession 
of a grant liaison officer and the extent of acquaintance 
with Councils.
The relationship between urban reform institu­
tions and the overall frequency of contact local officials 
have with Federal Regional Councils was explored. The 
null hypotheses were accepted for all the reform variables 
associated with frequency of Council contact. Indeed, 
it is of interest to note that partisan vis-a-vis non­
partisan government correlated positively with frequency 
of Federal Regional Council contact by local officials.
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The relationship between local government reform 
institutions and the frequency with which other selected 
sources of grant information and/or assistance are con­
sulted by city officials was explored. The null hypothesis 
was accepted for each of the dependent variables. An 
elected mayor vis-k-vis a mayor appointed by the city 
council associated significantly with high frequency of 
contact with other sources.
The relationship between urban reform institutions 
and the combined effectiveness and frequency rating of 
Councils vis-a-vis other grant sources was analyzed. The 
hypothesis was confirmed for the relationship between 
at-large selection of the city council and high effective­
ness rating of Councils. The null hypothesis was accepted 
for the following variables and their relationship to 
Council effectiveness ratings; nonpartisan government, 
grant liaison officer, percent of city employees on a 
merit system, city manager form of government, at-large 
selection of Council, method used in mayoral selection 
and reform score.
The null hypotheses were accepted for all local 
government reform variables as they relate to a combined 
frequency of contact and effectiveness of contact rating 
for Congressmen and Senators.
The relationship between local government reform 
variables and a combined frequency of contact and
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effectiveness of contact rating for direct contact with a 
Washington agency was analyzed. The hypothesis was 
accepted for the possession of a grant liaison officer 
associated with this dependent variable. The null 
hypotheses were accepted for all other reform variables 
associated with this particular rating.
The relationship between local government reform 
variables and the combined effectiveness and frequency 
of contact rating of C.O.G.s was examined. These hypotheses 
were accepted; at-large selection of city council members 
and high C.O.G. rating; high city reform score and high 
0.0.6. rating; and, nonpartisanship local government and 
high C.O.G. ranking. Other hypothesized relationships 
concerning local government reform variables associated 
with the frequency and effectiveness rating for C.O.G.s 
were rejected.
The null hypotheses were accepted for all local 
government reform variables as they relate to a combined 
frequency and effectiveness rating for district federal 
offices.
The hypothesized relationship between reform 
institutions and the extent city officials perceive Councils 
positively was totally rejected for all reform institu­
tion variables. The null hypothesis was confirmed in all 
cases when reform variables were correlated with the extent 
of positive attitudes.
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The association between magnitude of population 
and the level of acquaintance cities have with Federal 
Regional Councils was examined. The null hypothesis was 
accepted for this relationship. The null hypothesis was 
accepted for each of the other socioeconomic variables in 
association with level of Council acquaintance: median
income, per capita income, median education level, families 
earning less than #3,000 yearly, unemployment and Federal 
region.
The association between magnitude of population 
and the overall frequency of contact city officials have 
with Councils was examined. The null hypothesis was con­
firmed in this relationship and the hypothesis rejected.
The null hypothesis was accepted for the relationship 
between frequency of contact and the following city socio­
economic variables: per capita income, extent of unem­
ployment, and Federal region. The hypothesis was confirmed 
in the relationship between frequency of Council contact 
and the following socioeconomic data: high median income
and low Council contact, low poverty level and low contact, 
and high educational level and low contact.
The relationship between magnitude of population 
and the overall frequency of contact city officials have 
with other sources of grant information and/or assistance 
was examined. The hypothesis was accepted for this rela­
tionship, i.e., high population positively associates
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positively with high frequency of contact with other 
sources of grant information and assistance. The hypothesis 
was also confirmed concerning high poverty and high fre­
quency of contact with other grant sources. The null 
hypotheses were accepted for the other city socioeconomic 
variables as they correlate with this dependent variable.
The association between magnitude of population 
and the combined frequency and effectiveness rating of 
Federal Regional Councils was explored. The null hypothesis 
was accepted for this relationship. The null hypothesis 
was also accepted for all socioeconomic variables asso­
ciated with this dependent variable.
The association between magnitude of population 
and the combined frequency and effectiveness rating of 
Congressmen and Senators was analyzed. The null hypothesis 
was accepted for this relationship. The null hypotheses 
were accepted for all socioeconomic variables as they 
associate with the rating of Congressmen and Senators.
The correlation between magnitude of population 
and the combined frequency and effectiveness rating of 
direct to Washington contact was examined. The hypothesis 
was accepted for this relationship, i.e., high city popu­
lation positively associates with high direct to Washington 
contact. The null hypotheses were accepted for the other 
socioeconomic variables as they correlate with the fre­
quency and effectiveness rating of Washington contact.
170
The relationship between magnitude of population 
and the combined frequency and effectiveness rating of
C.O.G.s was explored. The null hypothesis was accepted 
for this relationship. In fact high population associates 
positively with a low C.O.G. rating. The null hypotheses 
were accepted also for the other socioeconomic variables 
as they associate with this dependent variable.
The association between magnitude of population 
and the combined frequency and effectiveness rating of 
district Federal offices was analyzed. The null hypothesis 
was accepted for this relationship. The null hypotheses 
were also accepted for all socioeconomic variables as 
they associate with the rating of district federal offices.
The relationship between magnitude of population 
and the extent of positive attitudes city officials hold 
toward Councils was examined. The null hypothesis was 
confirmed in this case and the hypothesis was rejected.
The null hypothesis was accepted for each of the socio­
economic variables in this relationship.
The hypothesis that Federal Regional Council 
members believe they have a greater sensitivity to the 
needs of local officials than do Washington bureaucrats 
was accepted. This response was found to be statistically 
significant.
The hypothesis concerning members of the Council 
are of the opinion that the Council is contacted on a
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regular basis by city officials seeking information and/or 
assistance was rejected. The response was found to not 
be statistically significant.
The hypothesis that Council members perceived that 
one of the organization's primary problems is a lack of 
sufficient decentralization of Council departments and 
agencies was accepted. The response to this item was 
statistically significant.
The hypothesis that Council members think a 
stronger coordination mechanism would facilitate the 
Council's effectiveness was accepted. The response to 
this item was found to be statistically significant also.
Other responses which were found to be statisti­
cally significant were: The Council makes an effort to
keep city managers familiar with Council programs; the 
Council system allows Federal officials a closer working 
arrangement with city officials than the previous arrange­
ment; a city official is better served by contacting his 
district Federal office when his grant question concerns
a specific agency; Councils expedite the grant process when 
a grant in question relates to several agencies on the Coun­
cil; if equal line authority were granted to each Council 
member, the Council would benefit; members who have more 
line authority also play a more effective role on the Coun­
cil; the Office of Management and Budget's role should not 
be increased so it has power of enforcement; the Council
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Chairman should not be given line authority over other 
Council members; and, when a Council member is torn between 
the expectations of his agency and the Council, he decides 
in favor of the agency.
It appears that Council members agree strongly 
with such writers as Clark, Mogulof, and Kolberg, that the 
lack of decentralization of Council departments is an 
impediment to effective Council operation. There appears 
to be substantial agreement, both from the standpoint of 
Council members and staff, with the Mogulof assertion that 
the decision making system of Federal Regional Councils 
is limited to the extent that Council members are ineffec­
tive in the area of.inducing coordination. Council members, 
however, disagree with the Mogulof contention that the Office 
of Management and Budget should play a more aggressive role 
on the Council.
Council members agreed with the Office of Manage­
ment and Budget's assessment of Councils on the point that 
the Councils were being impeded from being effective 
because of member agencies' lack of, or variation in, 
decentralized decision making authority. They disagreed 
with the Office of Management and Budget recommendation 
concerning increasing the authority of the Council chair­
man.
Because of the nature of the research the implica­
tions that can readily be drawn from this study are, of
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course, limited. This research found, as did the Office 
of Management and Budget study, that officials of larger 
units of local government generally knew about, or claimed 
they knew about, the Federal Regional Council system and 
its programs. This alleged familiarity with Councils, how­
ever, must be taken with some reservations, e.g., two city 
officials in Federal Region IX who contended they were 
familiar with the Coyncil system stated that their Council 
was located in Los Angeles.
Certainly the Council system has not revolutionized 
Federal grant administration as it relates to urban areas.
In terms of effectiveness and frequency of contact, tradi­
tional grant access sources continue to outrank Councils.
In some cases, e.g., district Federal office contact and 
direct communication to Washington, these traditional 
sources by far outrank Councils. However, there is some 
tendency for city officials to turn to Councils when they 
are seeking information and/or assistance with grants.
The fact that Councils placed above Congressmen and Senators 
concerning the frequency consulted for information about 
grants, and above Council of Governments concerning the 
frequency with which local officials seek assistance with 
a grant problem should not be taken lightly. This certainly 
signifies a modicum of acceptance of the Council's role 
as a grant administration device. One could surmise that 
as the Council system becomes more institutionalized in
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the Federal structure that city officials will increasingly 
utilize the. services provided by the Council.
The fact that city officials perceive the Councils 
as being more likely to respond with action to local needs 
than are Washington bureaucrats, and that Council members 
have more sensitivity to the needs of cities, is perhaps 
a portent that Councils are being accepted as a mechanism 
for providing a comprehensive range of Federal grant assis­
tance. Emphasizing this vein of thought is the finding 
that city officials disagree with the conceptualization 
of Councils as being merely another bureaucratic layer, 
but agree, on the other hand, that Councils should indeed 
be maintained as a permanent part of the Federal structure.
In attempting to discern meaningful implications 
from the government structure and socioeconomic analysis 
of the attitudes of Council service recipients, the finding 
that the presence of a city grant liaison officer signifi­
cantly increases the probability that a given city will 
be familiar with the Council system certainly comes as no 
great surprise. It is assumed that a professional grant 
liaison officer would be quite familiar with Federal inno­
vations such as the Council system, and this officer 
would transmit such information to his peers within the 
city government.
The positive association between partisan city 
government and high frequency of contact to Councils can
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perhaps be explained by observing that partisan city coun­
cil members would probably have more of a tendency to see 
the political ramifications of Federal Regional Councils, 
e.g., Republican mayors or Republican council members may 
readily identify with the New Federalism goals and objec­
tives of which Councils, of course, are an integral part. 
Consequently there may be a tendency for these partisan 
cities to more frequently utilize the services of the Coun­
cil than nonpartisan cities.
The positive association between at-large selection 
of the city council and high effectiveness ratings of 
Councils can be interpreted by observing the propensity 
of the at-large institution to elect officials who are of 
the blue ribbon and Chamber of Commerce genre who would 
more favorably perceive the reform and innovative aspects 
of Councils than would elected city officials.
Of some surprise is the fact that magnitude of 
population did not have a significant impact on the extent 
of familiarity city officials have with Councils, or with 
the frequency city officials consult Councils. Of course 
the demarcation point of this study was a magnitude of 
population of $0 ,000; consequently, one is dealing only 
with larger units of government. High population magnitude 
does correlate with the overall frequency of contact city 
officials have with other sources.of grant information 
and/or assistance, e.g., in the case of direct contact to
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Washington. The finding that high population magnitude 
associates positively with a low Council of Government 
frequency of contact and effectiveness rating can be 
explained, in part, by the observation that smaller units 
of government usually support the Council of Government's 
efforts of area wide metropolitan planning more extensively 
than do the larger units, primarily because the larger 
unit perceives it has more to lose in compromises that 
are encouraged by the Council of Government Association.
The finding that high median income, low city 
poverty level, and high educational level all correlate 
positively with low Council contact can perhaps be explained 
in part by looking at the agencies which are on the Council. 
Since they are basically "human resource" agencies, it is 
assumed that cities with a lower socioeconomic index will 
best utilize the services of the Councils significantly 
more than cities with a higher socioeconomic index, i.e., 
cities with a low socioeconomic level will contact the 
Councils more frequently for information and/or assistance 
with grants that relate to social problems.
It is of interest that Council members' perception 
of themselves as being more sensitive to the needs of local 
officials than are Washington bureaucrats is a view shared 
by city officials. Another area in which Council members' 
self perception is compatible with city officials' attitudes 
is that Councils make an effort to keep city managers
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familiar with Council programs. Some Council members do 
seem to have a somewhat exaggerated opinion, of the fre­
quency with which Councils are consulted by city officials.
A small majority of Council members stated that Councils 
were consulted by city officials on a regular basis. To 
the contrary, contact with Councils by city officials on 
a regular basis appears to be the exception rather than 
the rule. Council members do not believe that Councils 
have been successful in achieving program coordination, 
a view that is apparently shared by the city officials.
In the final analysis one could observe that while 
Councils have obviously not revolutionized the Federal 
grant administration system to cities, they nevertheless 
have had some impact. It appears, however, that city offi­
cials need to be much better informed about Federal Regional 
Councils and what services they can provide them. City 
officials, it seems, must utilize the services of the Coun­
cils more frequently than the present or Councils may become 
another tea and crumpet organization, providing a forum 
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QUfîSTXONNAÏRK TO CITIES
1. What is the population, of your city?
2. What is the percent of city employees under the merit system in 
this city?________ _
3. The form of government of this city can be described as 
________ 1. City manager
2. Mayor
3. Commission
4. What characteristics of the following best describe your city's 
form? (Check the appropriate spaces.)
A. Nonpartisan election Partisan election system________
system______
B. At large selection of Ward selection of council_______
council______
C. Mayoral selection by Mayoral selection by the
council______  electorate_______
5. Does your city presently have an office (either in the city or 
Washington) devoted to carrying on liaison activities with the 
federal government concerning federal grants? Yes  No___
6. The Federal Regional Council that services this city is locate' 
i n ___________________________ .
Questions one through nine relate to the role and participâtio; 
of your city.
1. On the average what is your frequency of contact (via telephon 
letter, personal communication, etc.) with Federal Regional 
Council Officials?
________ 1. More often than once a month
2. Four to twelve times a year
3. Two or three times a year
4. Once a year or less often
5. Never
2. On the average what is the frequency of contact made directly 
a Washington federal department or agency?
________ 1. More often than once a month
2. Four to twelve times a year
3. Two or three times a year




3. On the average what is the frequency of contact made with your
Congressmen or Senators in seeking information about or assis­
tance with federal grants?
- __ 1. More often than once a month
2. Four to twelve times a year 
. 3» Two or three times a year . .
4. Once a year or less often
3' Never . . .
4. On the average what is the frequency of contact made to a Council 
of Government (C.O.G.) in seeking information about or assistance 
with federal grants?
. _____ 1, More often than once ,a month
2. Four to twelve times a year
3. Two or three times a year
4. Once a year or less often
5. Never .
5. On the average what is the frequency of contact made to your 
district federal offices or other federal sub-regional offices 
/±f they exist for specific functional areas7?
________ 1. More often than once a month
2. Four to twelve times a year
3. Two or three times a year
4. Once a year or less often
3. Never
6. In relation to effectiveness of contact how would you rank the 
following access routes for gaining general information about 
available grants on a one (1) to five (3) ranking? /Tl) being 
the most effective]/
________ Congressmen and Senators
________ Direct contact to Washington
 ____  Federal Regional Council
________ Council of Government (C.O.G.)
________ District federal offices or other federal sub-regional
offices (if they exist for specific functional areas)
7. In relation to effectiveness of contact how would you rank the 
following access routes for solving a problem during a grant 
negotiation on a one (1) to five (3) ranking? /Tl) being the 
most effective^
________ Congressmen and Senators
________ Direct contact to Washington
________ Federal Regional Council
________ Council of Government (C.O.G.)
________ District federal offices or other federal sub-regionaJ
offices (if they exist for specific functional areas)
i8y
8, Rank each of the following access routes ou a one (1) to 
five (5) ranking to correspond with frequency of contact you
make in relation to seeking general information about available
grants. /Tl) being the most effective]/
________ Congressmen and Senators
_______ Direct contact to Washington
________ Federal Regional Council
________ Council of Government (C.O.G.)
________ District federal offices or other federal sub-regional
offices (if they exist for specific functional areas)
9. Rank each of the following access routes on a one (1) to 
five (5) ranking to correspond with frequency of contact you
make in relation to seeking assistance with a grant problem.
^^1) being the most effective]/
________ Congressmen and Senators
________ Direct contact to Washington
________ Federal Regional Council
________ Council of Government (C.O.G.)
________ District federal offices or other federal sub-regional
offices (if they exist for specific functional areas)
Questions one through three seek to gain information on your 
role as an official in city government.




2. I have attended meetings sponsored by a Federal Regional Councd 
________ 1. Yes
2. No




Questions one through fourteen seek to elicit your opinion or 
judgment on various items concerning the Federal Regional Com 
that services your city,
1. Federal Regional Councils have expedited the grant process foj 
this city.
________ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
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2. Federal Regional Councils devote too much of their time and
efforts to large cities (over 250,000 population) at the expense 
of -smaller cities. .
.... . 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
3w Federal Regional Councils devote too much of their time and 
effort to smaller cities (under 250,000 population) at the 
expense of larger cities.
 . 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
4. Agency members of the Federal Regional Council lack sufficient 
authority to make decisions and consequently must frequently 
clear problems encountered on the Council with their department 
chiefs in Washington.
________ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
5. The best way to characterize Federal Regional Councils is that 
they are merely another bureaucratic obstacle one faces when 
he seeks to obtain a federal grant.
________ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
6. I believe that Federal Regional Councils should continue as a
permanent part of the federal structure.
________ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
7. The Federal Regional Council in this region attempts to keep 
this city informed about the Council's activities and programs
that have a bearing on urban needs.
________ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
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8. Federal Regional Councils have reduced the number of steps 
necessary in obtaining a grant.
________ 1 m Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly 
3- Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
3. Disagree strongly
9. Federal Regional Council members have a greater sensitivity 
and awareness of the needs of local governments than do 
Washington bureaucrats.
________ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly 
5* Disagree strongly
10. Federal Regional Council members are more likely to respond with 
action to local needs and problems than are bureaucrats in 
Washington.
________ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
11. The Federal Regional Council members have coordinated informatioi 
from their respective agencies concerning federal grants for 
this city when this city has made an inquiry for such informatio; 
  1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
12. The members of the Federal Regional Council have coordinated 
the resources of their respective agencies in relation to 
solving grant problems for this city.
________ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly 
5* Disagree strongly
13. Federal Regional Councils have reduced the number of contacts 
your city makes with other sources, e.g.. Congressmen and 
senators, direct to Washington, C.O.G.s, and district federal 
offices.
________ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
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l4. Contacte with the Federal Regional Council have been beneficial 
to my city. . . . .. .
.1. Agree strongly _
2. Agree, but not very strongly 
•3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5* Disagree strongly ' -
15» I am an official of thé city of ~ . ' .
QUESTIONNAIRE TO FEDERAL REGIONAL COUNCILS
1. One of the principal problems of the Federal Regional Council 
is lack of sufficient decentralization of member departments 
and agencies.
________ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly 
3« Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
2. If the same amount of line authority were granted to each of 
the Federal Regional Council members within their respective 
agencies, the Council would be able to perform its functions 
more effectively than at the present.
_______  1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
3. Those Federal Regional Council members who have more line 
authority usually play a more effective role on the Council 
than those members who have less line authority.
• _____ 1. Agrée strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
4. Since the Federal Regional Council arrangement operates by 
consensus this usually prevents Council members from taking 
effective action--as an organization--on issues in which ther; 
is considerable conflict among the Council members.
_______  1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
5. The Federal Regional Council arrangement should continue as 
a permanent part of the federal structure.
_______  1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends




6. Issues that, have à high potential for controversy are at 
times.avoided by the~Federal Regional«Council; . .
 ______  1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but hot very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
k. Disagree, but not very strongly 
5» Disagree strongly
7* Most city managers of cities over 50,000 population within 
your region have working contacts with the Federal Regional 
Council.
________  1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly 
3- Not sure, it depends
4 . Disagree, but not very strongly 
5» Disagree strongly
8. Federal Regional Councils are usually short on supergrade 
staff to provide continuing direction and administration in 
respect to Council decisions.
1. Agree strongly
■ 2. Agree, but not very strongly 
3* Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
9. This Federal Regional Council makes an effort to keep city 
managers within the region familiar with Council programs 
that relate to urban needs.
________  1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly 
5* Disagree strongly
10. This Federal Regional Council is consulted on a regular basis 
by city officials seeking general information about federal • 
grants.
________  1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
11. This Federal Regional Council is consulted frequently by city 
officials seeking specialized assistance with grant-in-aid 
problems.
.______ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
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12. The Federal Regional Council allows federal officials in the 
region a closer working arrangement with city officials than 
these local officials had with Washington bureaucrats prior 
to formulation of the Council arrangement.
________  1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
13. Federal Regional Councils expedite the grant process when the 
grant relates to several different agencies on the Council. 
________  1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
14. Individual members of the Federal Regional Council find it 
necessary to frequently clear up problems by passing them to 
the Washington level.
________  1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
15. Federal Regional Council members have a greater sensitivity 
to the needs of local governments in their region than do 
Washington bureaucrats.
________  1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3 . Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly 
5* Disagree strongly
16. The Federal Regional Council is becoming more institutionalized 
and accepted by local officials as the place where the deci­
sions on program approval and implementation are made.
________  1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3 . Not sure, it, depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
17. The Federal Regional Council has been very successful in
achieving its stated purpose of program coordination.
________  1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3 . Not sure, it depends •
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5 . Disagree strongly
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l8. The Federal Regional Council experienced some disagreement 
among its members because of functional agency pressures to 
avoid compromising agency interest.
________ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
19* On the average Federal Regional Councils are of little assis­
tance to cities in the grant process except when a grant in 
question relates to several different agencies on the Council, 
________ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
20. If a city official has a question concerning a grant that is 
handled by a specific federal agency he is usually better 
served by contacting the related district federal office 
rather than the Federal Regional Council.
________ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
21. In order for Federal Regional Councils to perform adequately 
there must be a stronger coordination mechanism within the 
Council than now exists.
________ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
22. The Office of Management and Budget's role within the Council 
should be increased so that this agency can act as a coordi­
nating influence with power of enforcement.
________ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
23. This Federal Regional Council has sponsored meetings for city 
officials in the region.
________ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3 . Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5 . Disagree strongly
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24. The Council Chairman should be given line authority over 
other Council members.
________ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
3. Disagree strongly
25. A Council Chairman should not have to also serve as his 
agency’s regional head because this divides his time too much 
between agency and Council duties.
________ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3 . Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5 . Disagree strongly
26. The Undersecretaries Group can be characterized by permissive 
management.
________ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3 . Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5 . Disagree strongly
27. This Council operates best when the Undersecretaries Group 
provides clear management direction and assistance.
________ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3 . Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5 . Disagree strongly
28. This Council would operate more effectively if O.M.B. would 
assign a full time permanent representative here.
________ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3 . Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5 . Disagree strongly
29. The absence of formalized standards for planning work and 
reporting progress curtail the effectiveness of this Council. 
  1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3 . Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5 . Disagree strongly
196
30» I bave observed Council members experiencing conflict as a 
result of functional expectations of one's agency contra­
dicting the area coordination expectations of the Council.
________1. Agree, strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly 
3* Not sure, it depends 
4» Disagree, but not very strongly 
5- Disagree strongly
31. In a situation where a Council member is torn between the 
expectations of his agency and the expectations of the Council 
he usually decides in favor of his agency.
________ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly
32. This Federal Regional Council is located in Federal Region
